東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Optimal information disclosure and o...

Zhang, Mengxi.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Optimal information disclosure and optimal learning.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Optimal information disclosure and optimal learning./
作者:	Zhang, Mengxi.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	104 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-07A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10018223
ISBN:	9781339506630

Optimal information disclosure and optimal learning.
Zhang, Mengxi.

Optimal information disclosure and optimal learning. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 104 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2015.

This dissertation addresses the effect of information on firm and individual behavior. The first chapter examines the design of an optimal feedback mechanism by an informed principal and uses the results to explain why firms tend to assign coarse subjective ratings to their employees. When a firm has private information about an employee's ability, it can communicate this information through a subjective evaluation mechanism. I characterize the firm's optimal disclosure policy as a function of the worker's ability distribution and provide an algorithm to compute it. Further, I show that with some reasonable restrictions on the ability distribution, the firm's optimal strategy is always to reward the best workers, fire the worst ones, and assign one central rating to the rest.

ISBN: 9781339506630Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Optimal information disclosure and optimal learning.
LDR:03063nmm a2200313 4500 001 2119368
005 20170619071227.5
008 180830s2015 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781339506630
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10018223
035 $a AAI10018223
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Zhang, Mengxi. $3 3281239
245 1 0 $a Optimal information disclosure and optimal learning.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2015
300 $a 104 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Barton L. Lipman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2015.
520 $a This dissertation addresses the effect of information on firm and individual behavior. The first chapter examines the design of an optimal feedback mechanism by an informed principal and uses the results to explain why firms tend to assign coarse subjective ratings to their employees. When a firm has private information about an employee's ability, it can communicate this information through a subjective evaluation mechanism. I characterize the firm's optimal disclosure policy as a function of the worker's ability distribution and provide an algorithm to compute it. Further, I show that with some reasonable restrictions on the ability distribution, the firm's optimal strategy is always to reward the best workers, fire the worst ones, and assign one central rating to the rest.
520 $a The second chapter investigates an informed principal's optimal feedback strategy in a dynamic setting. I first consider the case where both parties have non-binding outside options. In this case, if the principal ever wants to reveal any information, she will do so at the earliest possible stage. Moreover, the optimal disclosure policy can be characterized in the same way as in the static case. The same conclusion holds for the case where both parties have binding and constant outside options. I also discuss the case where both parties have binding and time-variant outside options. After incorporating firms' need to promote and/or to retain workers, the model is used to explain wage dynamics.
520 $a The third chapter models a decision maker who "rationally" distorts his own belief to avoid the feeling of regret. People often suffer from regret when they realize that their previous choices were suboptimal. As a result, in a dynamic setting where information is revealed gradually, people are tempted to deny new negative information in order to avoid regret. At the same time, they are also aware of the economic cost of such belief distortions. A "rational" decision maker will optimally trade off these two concerns and choose his own belief accordingly. This tradeoff makes the past affect current decisions and hence can explain the sunk cost fallacy.
590 $a School code: 0017.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a Boston University. $b Economics. $3 3168349
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-07A(E).
790 $a 0017
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10018223