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Essays in Microeconomics and Market ...

Yoder, Nathan.

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Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design./
作者:	Yoder, Nathan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	188 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-09A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10278544
ISBN:	9781369745702

Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design.
Yoder, Nathan.

Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 188 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2017.

Chapter 1: Designing Incentives for Academic Research.

ISBN: 9781369745702Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design.
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245 1 0 $a Essays in Microeconomics and Market Design.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-09(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Marzena J. Rostek.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2017.
520 $a Chapter 1: Designing Incentives for Academic Research.
520 $a I consider the problem faced by a research institution contracting with a researcher of unknown quality to gather verifiable information so that other agents can make better decisions. In keeping with current practice, the institution contracts based on the experiment's result instead of its methodology. This removes a degree of freedom from its design problem, but I show that there need not be loss from doing so. The optimal contract has two general characteristics. First, to discourage the production of false positive results, negative results supporting conventional wisdom must be rewarded. Second, the most informative results must be disproportionately rewarded.
520 $a Chapter 2: Matching with Multilateral Contracts (with Marzena Rostek).
520 $a The matching literature has focused on bilateral agreements. In this paper, we examine stability in environments where groups of agents interact. We do so by extending the matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)) framework to allow for agreements among more than two agents and those which have externalities. This provides a unified framework that admits most of the matching, network formation, and coalition formation literatures as special cases. In both transferable and nontransferable utility environments, we give results on existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of stable outcomes in environments with substitutes and environments with complements. We also show how stable outcomes change when agreements are bundled together or become closer substitutes.
520 $a Chapter 3: Core Selection in Auctions and Exchanges (with Marzena Rostek).
520 $a It is well known that core implementation is possible in one-sided environments with the substitutes property. We characterize divisible good environments in which core-selecting design is possible, offering a unified treatment of auctions where trade is necessarily one-sided and those where agents and the auctioneer can both buy and sell. We show that heterogeneity in either pre-auction marginal utilities or substitution patterns can independently challenge core selection. We introduce a joint condition on preferences and equilibrium allocations which ensures that outcomes are in the core. Our results indicate that the key to core selection is the alignment between the bidders' incentives to substitute and the trades necessary to realize the available surplus.
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793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10278544