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Essays in Economic Theory.

Pram, Kym.

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Essays in Economic Theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Economic Theory./
作者:	Pram, Kym.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	98 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-10A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10117269
ISBN:	9781339786728

Essays in Economic Theory.
Pram, Kym.

Essays in Economic Theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 98 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2016.

This dissertation consists of three independent chapters on topics in microeconomic theory. In the first chapter, "Proving Just Enough: Hard Evidence and Welfare", I consider a model in which an agent with a privately known type can acquire arbitrary evidence before interacting with a principal. Evidence is hard information which the holder can choose whether to disclose. In a broad class of screening models, I show that there is always an equilibrium which interim Pareto-improves over the no-evidence benchmark whenever some types of the agent take an outside option in the benchmark case, and standard monotonicity and single-crossing conditions apply --- together with one other, commonly satisfied, condition. The monotonicity and single-crossing conditions can be dropped if the principal's payoffs are type-independent. I show that the sufficient conditions are tight and broadly applicable. Addressing concerns about multiple equilibria, I show how a planner can restrict the available evidence to ensure that an equilibrium in which the agent is better off than in the benchmark case is obtained.

ISBN: 9781339786728Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Economic Theory.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
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520 $a This dissertation consists of three independent chapters on topics in microeconomic theory. In the first chapter, "Proving Just Enough: Hard Evidence and Welfare", I consider a model in which an agent with a privately known type can acquire arbitrary evidence before interacting with a principal. Evidence is hard information which the holder can choose whether to disclose. In a broad class of screening models, I show that there is always an equilibrium which interim Pareto-improves over the no-evidence benchmark whenever some types of the agent take an outside option in the benchmark case, and standard monotonicity and single-crossing conditions apply --- together with one other, commonly satisfied, condition. The monotonicity and single-crossing conditions can be dropped if the principal's payoffs are type-independent. I show that the sufficient conditions are tight and broadly applicable. Addressing concerns about multiple equilibria, I show how a planner can restrict the available evidence to ensure that an equilibrium in which the agent is better off than in the benchmark case is obtained.
520 $a In the second chapter, "Weak Implementation", I study a notion of Bayes Nash implementation that is weaker but more natural than the notion that is standard in the literature. In particular, I define {\it Weak Implementation} under incomplete information: A social choice set is weakly implementable if the set of Bayes Nash equilibrium outcomes of some mechanism is a nonempty subset of the social choice set. Weak implementation is a more natural objective than either full or partial implementation in many cases. I show that there are social choice sets where every subset can be weakly implemented yet the set cannot be fully implemented. I give a complete characterization of the weakly implementable social choice sets under a weak restriction on preferences. Using similar techniques I also extend existing characterizations of full implementation.
520 $a In the third chapter, "On the Equivalence of Robustness to Canonical and General Elaborations" I prove an equivalence between two notions of robustness to incomplete information. A target equilibrium in a game of complete information is called robust to incomplete information when all nearby games of incomplete information have equilibria which generate similar ex-ante distributions over actions to the distribution generated by the target equilibrium. Robustness to canonical elaborations considers only nearby games with a special structure. I show that robustness to incomplete information and robustness to canonical elaborations are equivalent when the equilibrium concept in the nearby incomplete information games is agent normal form correlated equilibrium. As a corollary, in potential games, potential maximizers are robust to all elaborations.
590 $a School code: 0163.
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