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The non-reificatory approach to belief

Floyd, Richard.

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The non-reificatory approach to belief

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The non-reificatory approach to belief/ by Richard Floyd.
作者:	Floyd, Richard.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2017.,
面頁冊數:	ix, 212 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Chapter I. Approaching the Mind -- Chapter II. Wittgenstein, Ryle, and the Nature of Commonsense Psychology -- Chapter III. Belief and Explanation -- Chapter IV. Theory-Theory, Simulation, and Self-Ascription -- Chapter V. The Positive Account of Belief -- Chapter VI. Where Did it All Go Wrong? -- Conclusion.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Belief and doubt. -
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59873-4
ISBN:	9783319598734

The non-reificatory approach to belief
Floyd, Richard.

The non-reificatory approach to belief[electronic resource] /by Richard Floyd. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - ix, 212 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Chapter I. Approaching the Mind -- Chapter II. Wittgenstein, Ryle, and the Nature of Commonsense Psychology -- Chapter III. Belief and Explanation -- Chapter IV. Theory-Theory, Simulation, and Self-Ascription -- Chapter V. The Positive Account of Belief -- Chapter VI. Where Did it All Go Wrong? -- Conclusion.

This book argues against the mainstream view that we should treat propositional attitudes as internal states, suggesting that to treat beliefs as things of certain sort (i.e. to reify them) is a mistake. The reificatory view faces several problems that the non-reificatory view avoids, and it is argued the non-reificatory view is more faithful to the everyday concept of belief. There are several major reasons why it might be thought that a reificatory approach to mental states is nevertheless unavoidable, but this book attempts to show that none of these reasons is at all convincing; in each case, the evidence is consistent with a non-reificatory view. Having argued that the popularity of the reificatory view is unjustified, the author examines history of psychology and philosophy of mind, and the structure of psychological language, in order to show that this popularity is quite understandable, but mistaken nonetheless.

ISBN: 9783319598734

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-59873-4doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

569310
Belief and doubt.

LC Class. No.: BD215

Dewey Class. No.: 121.6

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