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Learning about a Reciprocating Oppon...

Liu, Pei-Pei.

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Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma./
Author:	Liu, Pei-Pei.
Description:	44 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-07B(E).
Subject:	Cognitive psychology. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3684414
ISBN:	9781321595116

Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
Liu, Pei-Pei.

Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. - 44 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2014.

Research has shown that reciprocation increases individuals' willingness to cooperate. This study investigates how individuals learn to cooperate with reciprocating opponents. To do so, we evaluated individuals' expectations about the behavior of their opponents during an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). In four experiments, participants played with a Tit-For-Tat (TFT) algorithm that occasionally failed to reciprocate. In Experiment 1, we first established whether individuals actually develop expectations about their opponents by utilizing a concurrent task. Our results indicate that when the opponents did not reciprocate, participants engaged in greater cognitive processing and were slower to respond to the concurrent task. Experiment 2 examined whether delayed reciprocation affects expectations about reciprocation using similar methodology. Our results indicate that expectations were weaker when reciprocation was delayed. In Experiment 3, we investigated two possible paths through which people may learn to cooperate with TFT. Specifically, we investigated whether the expectations people develop concern their own payoffs or the behavior of their opponents. Our results indicate that participants' expectations concern both their own payoffs and opponents' behavior. In Experiment 4, we sought for convergent evidence and a finer temporal resolution by employing pupillometry. Our results indicate that participants exhibited greater pupil sizes when expectations about reciprocation were violated.

ISBN: 9781321595116Subjects--Topical Terms:

523881
Cognitive psychology.

Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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100 1 $a Liu, Pei-Pei. $3 3191781
245 1 0 $a Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
300 $a 44 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: B.
500 $a Adviser: Christian Luhmann.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2014.
520 $a Research has shown that reciprocation increases individuals' willingness to cooperate. This study investigates how individuals learn to cooperate with reciprocating opponents. To do so, we evaluated individuals' expectations about the behavior of their opponents during an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). In four experiments, participants played with a Tit-For-Tat (TFT) algorithm that occasionally failed to reciprocate. In Experiment 1, we first established whether individuals actually develop expectations about their opponents by utilizing a concurrent task. Our results indicate that when the opponents did not reciprocate, participants engaged in greater cognitive processing and were slower to respond to the concurrent task. Experiment 2 examined whether delayed reciprocation affects expectations about reciprocation using similar methodology. Our results indicate that expectations were weaker when reciprocation was delayed. In Experiment 3, we investigated two possible paths through which people may learn to cooperate with TFT. Specifically, we investigated whether the expectations people develop concern their own payoffs or the behavior of their opponents. Our results indicate that participants' expectations concern both their own payoffs and opponents' behavior. In Experiment 4, we sought for convergent evidence and a finer temporal resolution by employing pupillometry. Our results indicate that participants exhibited greater pupil sizes when expectations about reciprocation were violated.
590 $a School code: 0771.
650 4 $a Cognitive psychology. $3 523881
650 4 $a Behavioral psychology. $3 2122788
650 4 $a Experimental psychology. $3 2144733
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710 2 $a State University of New York at Stony Brook. $b Experimental Psychology. $3 1685378
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-07B(E).
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3684414