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Employee selection practices and per...

Swaney, Amy M.

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Employee selection practices and performance pay.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Employee selection practices and performance pay./
作者:	Swaney, Amy M.
面頁冊數:	67 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-11A(E).
標題:	Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3628597
ISBN:	9781321047240

Employee selection practices and performance pay.
Swaney, Amy M.

Employee selection practices and performance pay. - 67 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University, 2014.

Moral hazard occurs when employee effort is unobservable and there is information asymmetry regarding the degree of congruence between employee and organizational goals. The empirical research in management control systems focuses on mitigating moral hazard in current employees, ex post of the hire date. However, both economics and management literature acknowledge that there is significant variation in employees' goal congruence even prior to hire. I examine the effectiveness of employee selection practices in resolving the information asymmetry regarding an applicant's ex ante goal congruence. I find that more extensive use of employee selection practices intended to identify goal congruence is positively associated with future employee performance. Further, I find that the association between employee selection practices and performance is weaker in firms that use performance pay in the initial employment contract. Interestingly, I also find a positive association between employee selection practices and use of performance pay in initial contracts.

ISBN: 9781321047240Subjects--Topical Terms:

516664
Management.

Employee selection practices and performance pay.
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245 1 0 $a Employee selection practices and performance pay.
300 $a 67 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Karen L. Sedatole.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University, 2014.
520 $a Moral hazard occurs when employee effort is unobservable and there is information asymmetry regarding the degree of congruence between employee and organizational goals. The empirical research in management control systems focuses on mitigating moral hazard in current employees, ex post of the hire date. However, both economics and management literature acknowledge that there is significant variation in employees' goal congruence even prior to hire. I examine the effectiveness of employee selection practices in resolving the information asymmetry regarding an applicant's ex ante goal congruence. I find that more extensive use of employee selection practices intended to identify goal congruence is positively associated with future employee performance. Further, I find that the association between employee selection practices and performance is weaker in firms that use performance pay in the initial employment contract. Interestingly, I also find a positive association between employee selection practices and use of performance pay in initial contracts.
590 $a School code: 0128.
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
650 4 $a Occupational psychology. $3 2122852
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0624
710 2 $a Michigan State University. $b Business Administration - Doctor of Philosophy. $3 2095416
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792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3628597