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The effects of trade openness and fi...

Pham, Van H.

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The effects of trade openness and firm characteristics on collusive corruption: Theory and empirical evidence.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The effects of trade openness and firm characteristics on collusive corruption: Theory and empirical evidence./
作者:	Pham, Van H.
面頁冊數:	135 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-11A(E).
標題:	Commerce-Business. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3627872
ISBN:	9781321033731

The effects of trade openness and firm characteristics on collusive corruption: Theory and empirical evidence.
Pham, Van H.

The effects of trade openness and firm characteristics on collusive corruption: Theory and empirical evidence. - 135 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2014.

My dissertation focuses on the effects of trade openness and firm characteristics on collusive corruption where in exchange for bribes, government officials let firms reduce costs by evading regulations. Chapter one models the effect of trade liberalization on firms' willingness to pay bribes to reduce costs using Melitz framework. When exporting costs decline, collusive corruption increases proportionately to production increase because benefits from bribery for firms increase. When a country trades with a less corrupt foreign counterpart, home country's active firms have higher productivity threshold than in the symmetric case and the exporters' productivity threshold decreases. Moreover, when foreign firms have to pay higher exporting costs, home country's active firms have lower productivity threshold and the exporters' productivity threshold increases. Chapter two examines empirically the effect of trade liberalization on the perceived level of general corruption and collusive corruption. Both cross-sectional and panel results show that trade openness reduces general corruption. Consistent with chapter one predictions, the effect of trade openness on the size of collusive corruption relative to sales is insignificant. Corruption levels of trading partners, homogeneous and differentiated good exported or imported shares in total exports and imports also affect the perceived level of general and collusive corruption. Contrary to theoretical predictions, chapter three shows that smaller and non-exporting firms pay more bribes, possibly due to beliefs in the prevalence of corruption and the necessity of bribery in doing business. Larger and exporting firms still pay bribes for operating and import licenses but can avoid bribes to secure government contracts. They also appear to be better at using lobbying, dispute resolutions, and regulation information provision in order to reach their goals. Moreover, contrary to the assumption in chapter one, return to bribes may exhibit economies of scale. Verification of this conjecture is left for future research.

ISBN: 9781321033731Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

The effects of trade openness and firm characteristics on collusive corruption: Theory and empirical evidence.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2014.
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