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An economic analysis of environmenta...

Tsai, Tsung-Hsiu.

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An economic analysis of environmental conflict resolution: A case study from Taiwan.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	An economic analysis of environmental conflict resolution: A case study from Taiwan./
Author:	Tsai, Tsung-Hsiu.
Description:	237 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-03, Section: A, page: 8290.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-03A.
Subject:	Agricultural economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9910428
ISBN:	9780599216433

An economic analysis of environmental conflict resolution: A case study from Taiwan.
Tsai, Tsung-Hsiu.

An economic analysis of environmental conflict resolution: A case study from Taiwan. - 237 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-03, Section: A, page: 8290.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1998.

In this dissertation I investigate environmental conflict resolution through private bargaining in the presence of uncertainty. The goals of this research are to explore the economic and social factors that lead to bargaining successes and failures, and to explore the type of institutional designs that can effectively assist agents in resolving their conflicts through negotiation. A dynamic Nash bargaining model---which allows each conflicting agent to have private/imperfect information and the ability to invest in information acquisition during bargaining---and two bargaining cases collected in Taiwan, are used to achieve the research goals. it is found that the major bargaining obstacles in a two-person bargaining framework include asymmetric information and reliability problems, costly information acquisition, the writing of incomplete contracts, imbalance in power and the use of threats. Thus, I propose appropriate institutional designs to reduce bargaining obstacles. These recommendations cover the role of the courts in designing contract law and tort liability, the role of the government in assisting information gathering, and the role of mediators in assisting communication between agents. This result suggests that the bargaining mechanisms commonly used in resolving environmental disputes, such as the alternative dispute resolution approach in the U.S. and the Nuisance Dispute Resolution Act in Taiwan, cannot alone resolve environmental disputes effectively. A more complete resolution mechanism requires an integration of the courts and the legislation in the management of externalities.

ISBN: 9780599216433Subjects--Topical Terms:

3172150
Agricultural economics.

An economic analysis of environmental conflict resolution: A case study from Taiwan.
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020 $a 9780599216433
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI9910428
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100 1 $a Tsai, Tsung-Hsiu. $3 3182063
245 1 3 $a An economic analysis of environmental conflict resolution: A case study from Taiwan.
300 $a 237 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-03, Section: A, page: 8290.
500 $a Supervisor: Jean-Paul Chavas.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1998.
520 $a In this dissertation I investigate environmental conflict resolution through private bargaining in the presence of uncertainty. The goals of this research are to explore the economic and social factors that lead to bargaining successes and failures, and to explore the type of institutional designs that can effectively assist agents in resolving their conflicts through negotiation. A dynamic Nash bargaining model---which allows each conflicting agent to have private/imperfect information and the ability to invest in information acquisition during bargaining---and two bargaining cases collected in Taiwan, are used to achieve the research goals. it is found that the major bargaining obstacles in a two-person bargaining framework include asymmetric information and reliability problems, costly information acquisition, the writing of incomplete contracts, imbalance in power and the use of threats. Thus, I propose appropriate institutional designs to reduce bargaining obstacles. These recommendations cover the role of the courts in designing contract law and tort liability, the role of the government in assisting information gathering, and the role of mediators in assisting communication between agents. This result suggests that the bargaining mechanisms commonly used in resolving environmental disputes, such as the alternative dispute resolution approach in the U.S. and the Nuisance Dispute Resolution Act in Taiwan, cannot alone resolve environmental disputes effectively. A more complete resolution mechanism requires an integration of the courts and the legislation in the management of externalities.
590 $a School code: 0262.
650 4 $a Agricultural economics. $3 3172150
650 4 $a Environmental science. $3 677245
690 $a 0503
690 $a 0768
710 2 $a The University of Wisconsin - Madison. $3 626640
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 60-03A.
790 $a 0262
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1998
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9910428