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Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and No...

Rigoni, Adam W.

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Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic./
Author:	Rigoni, Adam W.
Description:	150 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-06(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-06A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3672948
ISBN:	9781321505184

Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic.
Rigoni, Adam W.

Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic. - 150 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-06(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2014.

This dissertation develops, justifies, and examines the jurisprudential implications of a non-monotonic theory of common law legal reasoning. Legal rules seem to have exceptions but identifying all of them is difficult. This hinders attempts to formalize legal rules using classical logics. Non-monotonic logics allow defeasible inference, permitting rules that hold generally but can be defeated in the presence of exceptions. This ameliorates the problem of characterizing all exceptions to a rule, because exceptions can be added piecemeal while the rule remains. The first portion of the dissertation rebuts a prominent criticism leveled at a large class of theories of legal reasoning that includes my theory. The charge is that no coherent theory can recognize both (i) the difference between distinguishing and overruling, and (ii) the constraint of precedent. The critics argue that (ii) is more important than (i) and that (ii) can only be explained by monotonic legal rules. Drawing on cognitive psychology as well as legal theory, I show that coherent theories, such as my own, can accommodate both (i) and (ii).

ISBN: 9781321505184Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic.
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100 1 $a Rigoni, Adam W. $3 3179868
245 1 0 $a Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic.
300 $a 150 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-06(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Richmond H. Thomason.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2014.
520 $a This dissertation develops, justifies, and examines the jurisprudential implications of a non-monotonic theory of common law legal reasoning. Legal rules seem to have exceptions but identifying all of them is difficult. This hinders attempts to formalize legal rules using classical logics. Non-monotonic logics allow defeasible inference, permitting rules that hold generally but can be defeated in the presence of exceptions. This ameliorates the problem of characterizing all exceptions to a rule, because exceptions can be added piecemeal while the rule remains. The first portion of the dissertation rebuts a prominent criticism leveled at a large class of theories of legal reasoning that includes my theory. The charge is that no coherent theory can recognize both (i) the difference between distinguishing and overruling, and (ii) the constraint of precedent. The critics argue that (ii) is more important than (i) and that (ii) can only be explained by monotonic legal rules. Drawing on cognitive psychology as well as legal theory, I show that coherent theories, such as my own, can accommodate both (i) and (ii).
520 $a The second chapter provides motivation for understanding precedential constraint in terms of non-monotonic default rules and introduces my positive theory, which elaborates on John Horty's work in treating legal rules as prioritized defaults involving reasons. I motivate and implement a relaxation of Horty's restrictions on the form of rules to allow a more fine-grained characterization of precedent. Finally, I explore the relationship between these relaxations and the concept of precedent. The final section explains how my theory fits into the traditional jurisprudential ecosystem. I demonstrate that, contrary to assertions in the legal theory literature, this non-monotonic approach is entirely compatible with positivism's commitment to extracting rules from authoritative legal sources, namely court opinions. I also suggest how it might be attractive to law and economics theorists, pragmatists, and followers of Dworkin.
590 $a School code: 0127.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Law. $3 600858
650 4 $a Logic. $3 529544
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710 2 $a University of Michigan. $b Philosophy. $3 3179869
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-06A(E).
790 $a 0127
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3672948