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The Body: Phenomenology and Aestheti...

Kuzian, Edyta J.

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The Body: Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The Case of Dance.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Body: Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The Case of Dance./
Author:	Kuzian, Edyta J.
Description:	170 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-07A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3683386
ISBN:	9781321575095

The Body: Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The Case of Dance.
Kuzian, Edyta J.

The Body: Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The Case of Dance. - 170 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2014.

The central aim of my dissertation is to refine and extend Merleau-Ponty's notion of bodily intentionality in order to make sense of the kind of expressive meaning manifest in dance. Bodily intentionality is the idea that in everyday coping we can manifest sensitivity to the items in the environment without representing them. The dissertation has two major parts. The first part compares and contrasts Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of intentionality through a discussion of perceptual consciousness. My main argument is that while Merleau-Ponty succeeds in showing that intentionality is fundamentally embodied, his framework is limited only to the consideration of bodily task fulfillment. In the remainder of the dissertation, I build on his account by arguing for an aesthetic model of bodily intentionality, which is intended to help us understand expressive movement in dance, children's play, and gestures. Part two of the dissertation illustrates the aesthetic model by comparing the way in which several modern and contemporary choreographies draw on expressivity of the body.

ISBN: 9781321575095Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

The Body: Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The Case of Dance.
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245 1 4 $a The Body: Phenomenology and Aesthetics. The Case of Dance.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Jay M. Bernstein.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2014.
520 $a The central aim of my dissertation is to refine and extend Merleau-Ponty's notion of bodily intentionality in order to make sense of the kind of expressive meaning manifest in dance. Bodily intentionality is the idea that in everyday coping we can manifest sensitivity to the items in the environment without representing them. The dissertation has two major parts. The first part compares and contrasts Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of intentionality through a discussion of perceptual consciousness. My main argument is that while Merleau-Ponty succeeds in showing that intentionality is fundamentally embodied, his framework is limited only to the consideration of bodily task fulfillment. In the remainder of the dissertation, I build on his account by arguing for an aesthetic model of bodily intentionality, which is intended to help us understand expressive movement in dance, children's play, and gestures. Part two of the dissertation illustrates the aesthetic model by comparing the way in which several modern and contemporary choreographies draw on expressivity of the body.
520 $a The main claim of part one is that, although Merleau-Ponty's consideration of intentionality is to show that it is essentially embodied, he nevertheless retains a feature of the Husserlian model that he criticizes. To show this, I first clarify Husserl's model. Husserl holds a semantic conception of intentionality, which maintains that the content of both belief and perception should be understood on the model of linguistic meaning. By contrast, I argue, Merleau-Ponty holds that perceptual content should be differentiated from the semantic content of thoughts and judgments. In Merleau-Ponty's view, both pathological cases of bodily impairment and intact bodily movement reveal the mechanism of bodily intentionality in everyday coping. I argue, however, that this alternative view is limited. Merleau-Ponty views bodily movements as meaningful insofar as they serve task fulfillment. Perceptual consciousness is thereby reduced to an instrumental coping. Its meaning, like in the semantic meaning, is referential by pointing to something outside of it, to the results of performance rather than performance itself. As a result, his discussion does not include spontaneous, yet intelligible, bodily movement we perform for no specific purpose, like spontaneous gesturing during a conversation, children playing, or dancing.
520 $a Part two develops this suggestion by comparing classical, modern, and contemporary choreographies. On my account, classical, and to a certain extent modern choreographers are committed to a version of the semantic paradigm: they use story-telling as a way to make expressive bodily movement meaningful (e.g., Nijinsky, George Balanchine, Martha Graham, and Pina Bausch). They endorse a version of the semantic paradigm because such choreographers make bodily movements intelligible in terms of the concepts, or stories they are supposed to 'tell'. In my view, classical and some modern choreographies by using bodily movement as a vehicle for narration limit our appreciation of the body as an artful medium. By contrast, contemporary choreographies draw on the bodily movement as an inexhaustible source of expressive meaning (e.g., Trisha Brown, Ralph Lemon, Jody Melnick, and Boris Charmatz). The contemporary choreographers approach the dancing body in movement as artful on its own terms and not a means to express something other than itself. To develop this suggestion, I refer to Kant's notion of judgments of taste, which demands that in appreciating beauty we ought to view it as purposive without purpose. The point of the model of aesthetic intentionality is to view bodily movement as artful in just this way, as serving no specific goal, yet as meaningful. The body in dance is a sui generis manifestation of such non-categorizable intelligibility. The significance of my account is to articulate the kind of aesthetic bodily engagement in the world that does not take the form of representing the world.
590 $a School code: 1700.
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650 4 $a Aesthetics. $3 523036
650 4 $a Dance. $3 610547
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710 2 $a The New School. $b Philosophy. $3 2101064
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-07A(E).
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