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Price Competition, Innovation and Se...

Ding, Yucheng.

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Price Competition, Innovation and Search in Durable-goods Markets.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Price Competition, Innovation and Search in Durable-goods Markets./
Author:	Ding, Yucheng.
Description:	76 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-10A(E).
Subject:	Commerce-Business. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3704678
ISBN:	9781321772678

Price Competition, Innovation and Search in Durable-goods Markets.
Ding, Yucheng.

Price Competition, Innovation and Search in Durable-goods Markets. - 76 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2015.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies competition, innovation, and search in durable-goods markets. Specifically, it investigates three questions: First, how will counterfeit competition affect a branded firm's profit and social welfare in a durable-goods market? Second, how does an imitator's entry impact the durable-goods producer's R&D decision when consumers care about social status? And third, how are firms' profits affected by their positions when consumers search for a durable good sequentially? The second chapter explores why deceptive counterfeit competition may increase a branded firm's profit and total welfare. The reason is that counterfeits enable the branded firm to maintain a high price, which alleviates the time-inconsistency problem of a durable goods monopoly. The third chapter shows that, for conspicuous goods of durable nature, entry of imitators may increase the incumbent's R&D incentive. The result provides a theoretical justification for the weak protection of intellectual property in the fashion industry. The fourth chapter finds that when ex-ante heterogeneous consumers search for a durable good sequentially, a less prominent firm may earn a higher profit, because search cost enables the firm to cherry-pick high-value customers and commit to a high price.

ISBN: 9781321772678Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168423
Commerce-Business.

Price Competition, Innovation and Search in Durable-goods Markets.
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020 $a 9781321772678
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100 1 $a Ding, Yucheng. $3 3177243
245 1 0 $a Price Competition, Innovation and Search in Durable-goods Markets.
300 $a 76 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Yongmin Chen.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2015.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation studies competition, innovation, and search in durable-goods markets. Specifically, it investigates three questions: First, how will counterfeit competition affect a branded firm's profit and social welfare in a durable-goods market? Second, how does an imitator's entry impact the durable-goods producer's R&D decision when consumers care about social status? And third, how are firms' profits affected by their positions when consumers search for a durable good sequentially? The second chapter explores why deceptive counterfeit competition may increase a branded firm's profit and total welfare. The reason is that counterfeits enable the branded firm to maintain a high price, which alleviates the time-inconsistency problem of a durable goods monopoly. The third chapter shows that, for conspicuous goods of durable nature, entry of imitators may increase the incumbent's R&D incentive. The result provides a theoretical justification for the weak protection of intellectual property in the fashion industry. The fourth chapter finds that when ex-ante heterogeneous consumers search for a durable good sequentially, a less prominent firm may earn a higher profit, because search cost enables the firm to cherry-pick high-value customers and commit to a high price.
590 $a School code: 0051.
650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 3168423
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
690 $a 0505
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a University of Colorado at Boulder. $b Economics. $3 1022426
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-10A(E).
790 $a 0051
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3704678