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A defense of evidentialism about mor...

Pedersen, Johnnie R. R.

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A defense of evidentialism about moral intuitions.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A defense of evidentialism about moral intuitions./
作者:	Pedersen, Johnnie R. R.
面頁冊數:	253 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-04A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3646369
ISBN:	9781321363630

A defense of evidentialism about moral intuitions.
Pedersen, Johnnie R. R.

A defense of evidentialism about moral intuitions. - 253 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2014.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The dissertation offers a defense of the evidential view according to which, under favorable circumstances, moral intuitions are evidence of what the moral facts are. For short, the evidential view holds that moral intuitions are evidential. In the first part of the dissertation (chs. 1-4), I give reasons for accepting this view, and in the second part (chs. 5-7), I give responses to arguments that purport to show that moral intuitions are not evidential.

ISBN: 9781321363630Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

A defense of evidentialism about moral intuitions.
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245 1 2 $a A defense of evidentialism about moral intuitions.
300 $a 253 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-04(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: David Copp.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2014.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a The dissertation offers a defense of the evidential view according to which, under favorable circumstances, moral intuitions are evidence of what the moral facts are. For short, the evidential view holds that moral intuitions are evidential. In the first part of the dissertation (chs. 1-4), I give reasons for accepting this view, and in the second part (chs. 5-7), I give responses to arguments that purport to show that moral intuitions are not evidential.
520 $a The second part of the dissertation consists of an investigation of three major objections to the evidential status of intuitions in ethics. Thus, in chapter 5 I discuss one reason to view intuitions with suspicion, namely that they are subject to manipulation such as framing-effects. A second group of arguments, discussed in chapter 6, argue from a variety of assumptions about the origins of intuitions to the conclusion that they don't have an evidential status. Finally, in chapter 7, I discuss a third group of arguments that uses disagreements - the fact that different people have different, incompatible intuitions - to argue that intuitions don't have an evidential status. I explain how the different versions of these three types of objections do not undermine the plausibility of the evidential view. In two appendices to the dissertation I discuss two papers that contain arguments that are relevant to the evidential view. I have argued that moral philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux have argued against this view. In Appendix A I discuss and reject their arguments. In Appendix B I discuss and rebut Robert Cummins's view that intuitions are epistemologically useless in philosophical inquiries. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
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