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Generic Competition and Price Regula...

Colak, Berna.

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Generic Competition and Price Regulation in the European Union Pharmaceutical Market: The Case of Cardiovascular Medicines.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Generic Competition and Price Regulation in the European Union Pharmaceutical Market: The Case of Cardiovascular Medicines./
作者:	Colak, Berna.
面頁冊數:	94 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-08(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-08A(E).
標題:	Economics, Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3618657
ISBN:	9781303871115

Generic Competition and Price Regulation in the European Union Pharmaceutical Market: The Case of Cardiovascular Medicines.
Colak, Berna.

Generic Competition and Price Regulation in the European Union Pharmaceutical Market: The Case of Cardiovascular Medicines. - 94 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-08(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2014.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the extent of competition between generic products and therapeutic substitutes under different regulatory regimes in the European Union (EU) pharmaceutical industry. In particular, this study investigates generic competition among the five largest European pharmaceutical markets; the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, with comprehensive IMS data for 10 years (1994-2003), in order to estimate the effect of generic entry on drug prices at the product level. This analysis finds that generic entry has a negative effect on prices in countries with free pricing originator market, whereas in EU countries with strict price and reimbursement regulation, generic competition is ineffective and/or counterproductive. Fewer generics and less competitive late entrants are consistent with incentives in regulated environments: low regulated prices for originator products discourage generic entry following patent expiration. These findings suggest that regulation of both manufacturers' prices and retail pharmacy prices undermines price competition in the off-patent sector, and that budgetary savings from generic price competition are not realized in countries with strict regulatory systems.

ISBN: 9781303871115Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Generic Competition and Price Regulation in the European Union Pharmaceutical Market: The Case of Cardiovascular Medicines.
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245 1 0 $a Generic Competition and Price Regulation in the European Union Pharmaceutical Market: The Case of Cardiovascular Medicines.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-08(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Bradley P. Kamp; Gabriel Picone.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2014.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the extent of competition between generic products and therapeutic substitutes under different regulatory regimes in the European Union (EU) pharmaceutical industry. In particular, this study investigates generic competition among the five largest European pharmaceutical markets; the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, with comprehensive IMS data for 10 years (1994-2003), in order to estimate the effect of generic entry on drug prices at the product level. This analysis finds that generic entry has a negative effect on prices in countries with free pricing originator market, whereas in EU countries with strict price and reimbursement regulation, generic competition is ineffective and/or counterproductive. Fewer generics and less competitive late entrants are consistent with incentives in regulated environments: low regulated prices for originator products discourage generic entry following patent expiration. These findings suggest that regulation of both manufacturers' prices and retail pharmacy prices undermines price competition in the off-patent sector, and that budgetary savings from generic price competition are not realized in countries with strict regulatory systems.
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