東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Professional hubris: Chinese officer...

Setzekorn, Eric.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Professional hubris: Chinese officers, the United States and a failure of army building, 1942-1955.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Professional hubris: Chinese officers, the United States and a failure of army building, 1942-1955./
作者:	Setzekorn, Eric.
面頁冊數:	322 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-05A(E).
標題:	History, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3609615
ISBN:	9781303686351

Professional hubris: Chinese officers, the United States and a failure of army building, 1942-1955.
Setzekorn, Eric.

Professional hubris: Chinese officers, the United States and a failure of army building, 1942-1955. - 322 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 2014.

The core historical argument presented in this dissertation is that Chinese military officers within the GMD military were able to create a depoliticized military institution, develop foreign partnerships and define a distinct military officer identity to create a true "national" army for the first time in Chinese history during the years 1942-1955. These normative ideas, expressed most articulately by General Sun Liren, were able to achieve many of the status objectives of military officers. The process by which Chinese military officers selectively adopted ideas that supported their professional claims to jurisdiction over the management of violence strongly supports the conception of normative isomorphism where change is driven by desires for status and respect. Chinese military officers built on fifty years of Chinese military thought and foreign ideas to develop a conception of a Chinese Army that was structured to represent aspirations of China as a world power. The aspirations of Chinese officers align closely with models of organizational theory that highlight enduring patterns of professional development and global military trends. Throughout this process, the Unites States played a key role in introducing concepts and providing support to military officers but was never able to decisively shape the GMD/ROC military. The failure of the Chinese "army-building" project was not due to a lack of organizational, intellectual or professional development but because of a renewed politicization of military forces and a purge of key military leaders in 1955. Ultimately, the power of ideas, be it ideas of professional competence articulated by Sun Liren or political loyalty developed by Chiang Ching-kuo, and the ability to mobilize supporters of these ideas mattered far more than foreign advice or equipment.

ISBN: 9781303686351Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017448
History, General.

Professional hubris: Chinese officers, the United States and a failure of army building, 1942-1955.
LDR:02764nam a2200289 4500 001 1966521
005 20141125142314.5
008 150210s2014 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303686351
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3609615
035 $a AAI3609615
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Setzekorn, Eric. $3 2103347
245 1 0 $a Professional hubris: Chinese officers, the United States and a failure of army building, 1942-1955.
300 $a 322 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Edward McCord.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 2014.
520 $a The core historical argument presented in this dissertation is that Chinese military officers within the GMD military were able to create a depoliticized military institution, develop foreign partnerships and define a distinct military officer identity to create a true "national" army for the first time in Chinese history during the years 1942-1955. These normative ideas, expressed most articulately by General Sun Liren, were able to achieve many of the status objectives of military officers. The process by which Chinese military officers selectively adopted ideas that supported their professional claims to jurisdiction over the management of violence strongly supports the conception of normative isomorphism where change is driven by desires for status and respect. Chinese military officers built on fifty years of Chinese military thought and foreign ideas to develop a conception of a Chinese Army that was structured to represent aspirations of China as a world power. The aspirations of Chinese officers align closely with models of organizational theory that highlight enduring patterns of professional development and global military trends. Throughout this process, the Unites States played a key role in introducing concepts and providing support to military officers but was never able to decisively shape the GMD/ROC military. The failure of the Chinese "army-building" project was not due to a lack of organizational, intellectual or professional development but because of a renewed politicization of military forces and a purge of key military leaders in 1955. Ultimately, the power of ideas, be it ideas of professional competence articulated by Sun Liren or political loyalty developed by Chiang Ching-kuo, and the ability to mobilize supporters of these ideas mattered far more than foreign advice or equipment.
590 $a School code: 0075.
650 4 $a History, General. $3 1017448
650 4 $a History, Military. $3 1019083
650 4 $a History, Asia, Australia and Oceania. $3 626624
690 $a 0578
690 $a 0722
690 $a 0332
710 2 0 $a The George Washington University. $b History. $3 1043876
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-05A(E).
790 $a 0075
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3609615