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Descartes' Slight and Metaphysical D...

Layman, Chloe.

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Descartes' Slight and Metaphysical Doubt.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Descartes' Slight and Metaphysical Doubt./
作者:	Layman, Chloe.
面頁冊數:	154 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-02A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3600527
ISBN:	9781303506550

Descartes' Slight and Metaphysical Doubt.
Layman, Chloe.

Descartes' Slight and Metaphysical Doubt. - 154 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2013.

The goal of my dissertation is to argue that Descartes arrives at his account of self-knowledge by grappling with skepticism about introspection. As I interpret him, Descartes has his meditator attempt to undermine introspection so that he can replace his former beliefs about his mind's nature and activities with an account of self-knowledge that is immune from doubt. Just as he must show that reason and sense perception are sources of knowledge because they can withstand his skeptical challenges, he must also show that introspection is equally indubitable. To this end, he constructs the strongest arguments he can from the perspective of a skeptic who maintains that we can be ignorant of or in error about our thought. Then he attempts to show that none of the skeptic's premises can undermine his conclusion that we have infallible knowledge of our mind's nature and activities. My dissertation reconstructs these skeptical arguments in order to clarify the role they play in motivating (and ultimately grounding) Descartes' account of self-knowledge.

ISBN: 9781303506550Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Descartes' Slight and Metaphysical Doubt.
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