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Bringing Values Down to Earth.

University of California, Los Angeles.

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Bringing Values Down to Earth.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Bringing Values Down to Earth./
作者:	Gehrman, Kristina Marie.
面頁冊數:	259 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-03, Section: A, page: 1040.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International73-03A.
標題:	Ethics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3486560
ISBN:	9781267050885

Bringing Values Down to Earth.
Gehrman, Kristina Marie.

Bringing Values Down to Earth. - 259 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-03, Section: A, page: 1040.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2011.

In this dissertation, I argue for an expansive conception of 'natural facts', according to which such facts include many sorts of evaluative and normative truths. I aim to show that values and norms are part of the natural world around us; they are seamlessly integrated, irreducible features of the world. Using this expanded notion of 'fact', I argue that ordinary features of the world are what justify and explain our evaluative and normative judgments, and our practical decisions. I consider the implications of this picture for philosophical investigations of human action and agency, and the norms of human action. In the process of characterizing human agency, I identify some of the distinguishing marks of human practical excellence. I also demonstrate some important methodological implications of the claim that values are in nature, for philosophy of action and ethical theory.

ISBN: 9781267050885Subjects--Topical Terms:

517264
Ethics.

Bringing Values Down to Earth.
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245 1 0 $a Bringing Values Down to Earth.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-03, Section: A, page: 1040.
500 $a Adviser: Gavin Lawrence.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2011.
520 $a In this dissertation, I argue for an expansive conception of 'natural facts', according to which such facts include many sorts of evaluative and normative truths. I aim to show that values and norms are part of the natural world around us; they are seamlessly integrated, irreducible features of the world. Using this expanded notion of 'fact', I argue that ordinary features of the world are what justify and explain our evaluative and normative judgments, and our practical decisions. I consider the implications of this picture for philosophical investigations of human action and agency, and the norms of human action. In the process of characterizing human agency, I identify some of the distinguishing marks of human practical excellence. I also demonstrate some important methodological implications of the claim that values are in nature, for philosophy of action and ethical theory.
520 $a The view that I defend can be described as a form of neo-Aristotelian naturalism. I begin the dissertation in Chapter One by differentiating my own variety of naturalism from other sorts of neo-Aristotelian naturalism. Following John McDowell, I argue that it is a mistake to treat natural facts as if they give us instrumental or prudential reasons to do what is morally right, according to some independent conception of 'morally right'. But I argue (against McDowell) that ordinary facts, including facts about human nature, have all sorts of interesting normative and evaluative 'logical' implications. In particular, there is a certain kind of inference that I argue merits closer investigation. Such inferences, which I refer to as 'naturalist inferences', allow us to reason from ordinary facts about features of the world, to normative or evaluative conclusions, in a very simple way.
520 $a Naturalist inferences rely on characterizing claims about natural phenomena. These characterizations might include, for example, things like 'Planets are spherical', 'Oak trees are deciduous', and 'Humans use language'. In Chapters One and Two, I rely on Michael Thompson's account of characterizing claims. But ultimately I disagree with Thompson's account in certain important ways. Thompson thinks that 'Aristotelian categorical statements' (as he calls them) can only intelligibly be made about living things, whereas I think that one of the most exciting things about characterizations is that they are in place much more widely. The fact that characteristics are so widely present in the world is part of what helps us to see that values and nouns are a very widely present, highly varied natural phenomenon. If we think of characteristics as a varied and pretty much ubiquitous feature of reality, this will help us to understand values and norms as natural phenomena.
520 $a In the second part of Chapter Two, armed with the fact that characteristics are absolutely everywhere in nature, I develop a series of claims about the nature of values and norms, and the way in which they figure in evaluative, normative, and practical reasoning. I begin the central argument by observing that there are evidently many different sorts of characteristics of things in the world around us (including, of course, characteristics of human beings). My strategy is then simply to draw out and scrutinize the implications of characteristics like these, for our conception of values and norms. By reflecting on characteristics, we can see that our own practices of belief-formation and decision-making already presuppose that fact and value cannot be cleanly separated. There is no sharp, bright distinction between description and evaluation.
520 $a In Chapter Three, I turn to consider some action-theoretic implications of characteristic-based evaluation. When we appreciate that characteristics have normative implications, the following possibility comes to mind: perhaps we could give an account of the norms of human action, simply in terms of the characteristics of human action. But I argue that there is no material or substantive specification of the norms of action forthcoming from a characterization of human action. That is, even if we knew exactly what the characteristics of human action are, this would not yield a detailed account of which actions are right and which ones wrong, and why. But I argue that it is nonetheless very illuminating to ethical theory to have an accurate and detailed characterization of human agency and human action. The more we learn about human agency, the more clearly we can formulate our questions about what makes for better and worse actions. Accordingly, I propose a characterization of agency, and human agency in particular, based in part on Tyler Burge's conception of agency from Origins of Objectivity.
520 $a In Chapter Four, I discuss Hubert Dreyfus' deeply anti-rationalist conception of human practical nature. In so doing, I aim to bring the several findings of the first three chapters to bear on understanding practical excellence. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
590 $a School code: 0031.
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