東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Political externalities of free trad...

Ro, Hyeon Young.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Political externalities of free trade agreement: The opportunistic FTA strategy in East Asia.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Political externalities of free trade agreement: The opportunistic FTA strategy in East Asia./
作者:	Ro, Hyeon Young.
面頁冊數:	27 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 52-04.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International52-04(E).
標題:	Political Science, International Relations. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1549990
ISBN:	9781303634956

Political externalities of free trade agreement: The opportunistic FTA strategy in East Asia.
Ro, Hyeon Young.

Political externalities of free trade agreement: The opportunistic FTA strategy in East Asia. - 27 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 52-04.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2013.

How much do political incentives play a role in free trade agreements (FTAs)? While political economists focused much on the interaction between state and market, they have paid scant attention to analyzing the role of state's preference on trade strategies. I argue that when policy-makers face tough FTA negotiations, which often entail higher social costs, they tend to pay more attention on possible political externalities from trade policy. By utilizing the earlier literature on security externalities, I design a game-theoretic model that explains the role of political externalities on the leader's trade strategy. This leads to a conclusion that when policy-makers expect higher positive political externalities, they are more willing to cooperate in trade negotiations. The model effectively explains the recent FTA boom in Asia and the opportunistic strategies of the three major economies in East Asia---China, Japan, and South Korea.

ISBN: 9781303634956Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669648
Political Science, International Relations.

Political externalities of free trade agreement: The opportunistic FTA strategy in East Asia.
LDR:01817nam a2200277 4500 001 1962188
005 20140805104959.5
008 150210s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303634956
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI1549990
035 $a AAI1549990
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Ro, Hyeon Young. $3 2098223
245 1 0 $a Political externalities of free trade agreement: The opportunistic FTA strategy in East Asia.
300 $a 27 p.
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 52-04.
500 $a Advisers: Victor Cha; Christine Kim.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2013.
520 $a How much do political incentives play a role in free trade agreements (FTAs)? While political economists focused much on the interaction between state and market, they have paid scant attention to analyzing the role of state's preference on trade strategies. I argue that when policy-makers face tough FTA negotiations, which often entail higher social costs, they tend to pay more attention on possible political externalities from trade policy. By utilizing the earlier literature on security externalities, I design a game-theoretic model that explains the role of political externalities on the leader's trade strategy. This leads to a conclusion that when policy-makers expect higher positive political externalities, they are more willing to cooperate in trade negotiations. The model effectively explains the recent FTA boom in Asia and the opportunistic strategies of the three major economies in East Asia---China, Japan, and South Korea.
590 $a School code: 0076.
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a Georgetown University. $b Asian Studies. $3 2098224
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 52-04(E).
790 $a 0076
791 $a M.A.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1549990