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Characterizing distribution rules fo...

Gopalakrishnan, Ragavendran.

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Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games./
Author:	Gopalakrishnan, Ragavendran.
Description:	125 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-10B(E).
Subject:	Computer Science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3565140
ISBN:	9781303146527

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games.
Gopalakrishnan, Ragavendran.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games. - 125 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--California Institute of Technology, 2013.

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

ISBN: 9781303146527Subjects--Topical Terms:

626642
Computer Science.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games.
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100 1 $a Gopalakrishnan, Ragavendran. $3 2093119
245 1 0 $a Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games.
300 $a 125 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: B.
500 $a Adviser: Adam Wierman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--California Institute of Technology, 2013.
520 $a In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.
520 $a Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.
520 $a We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.
520 $a We also provide an alternative characterization---all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose---they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.
590 $a School code: 0037.
650 4 $a Computer Science. $3 626642
650 4 $a Applied Mathematics. $3 1669109
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0984
690 $a 0364
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a California Institute of Technology. $b Computer Science. $3 2092455
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-10B(E).
790 $a 0037
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3565140