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Value solutions in cooperative games

McCain, Roger A.

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Value solutions in cooperative games

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Value solutions in cooperative games/ by Roger A McCain.
作者:	McCain, Roger A.
出版者:	Hackensack, NJ :World Scientific Pub., : c2013,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (236 p.)
內容註:	Value solutions for superadditive transferable utility games in coalition function form -- Zeuthen-Nash bargaining -- Nontransferable utility games and games in partition function form -- A shapley value algorithm for games in partition function form -- Extension of the nucleolus to nontransferable utility games in partition function form -- A core imputation with variable bargaining power -- Bargaining power biform games -- Intertemporal cooperative games: a sketch of a theory -- A theory of enterprise.
標題:	Cooperative games (Mathematics) -
電子資源:	http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8528#t=toc
ISBN:	9814417408 (electronic bk.)

Value solutions in cooperative games
McCain, Roger A.

Value solutions in cooperative games[electronic resource] /by Roger A McCain. - Hackensack, NJ :World Scientific Pub.,c2013 - 1 online resource (236 p.)

Value solutions for superadditive transferable utility games in coalition function form -- Zeuthen-Nash bargaining -- Nontransferable utility games and games in partition function form -- A shapley value algorithm for games in partition function form -- Extension of the nucleolus to nontransferable utility games in partition function form -- A core imputation with variable bargaining power -- Bargaining power biform games -- Intertemporal cooperative games: a sketch of a theory -- A theory of enterprise.

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

ISBN: 9814417408 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

2089710
Cooperative games (Mathematics)

LC Class. No.: QA272.4 / .M35 2013

Dewey Class. No.: 519.3

Value solutions in cooperative games
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245 1 0 $a Value solutions in cooperative games $h [electronic resource] / $c by Roger A McCain.
260 $a Hackensack, NJ : $b World Scientific Pub., $c c2013
300 $a 1 online resource (236 p.)
505 0 $a Value solutions for superadditive transferable utility games in coalition function form -- Zeuthen-Nash bargaining -- Nontransferable utility games and games in partition function form -- A shapley value algorithm for games in partition function form -- Extension of the nucleolus to nontransferable utility games in partition function form -- A core imputation with variable bargaining power -- Bargaining power biform games -- Intertemporal cooperative games: a sketch of a theory -- A theory of enterprise.
520 $a This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
588 $a Description based on print version record.
650 0 $a Cooperative games (Mathematics) $3 2089710
650 0 $a Game theory. $3 532607
650 0 $a Values. $3 518648
856 4 0 $u http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8528#t=toc