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Uncommon ground: The making of indiv...

Goddard, Stacie Elizabeth.

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Uncommon ground: The making of indivisible issues (Denmark, Germany, Ireland).

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Uncommon ground: The making of indivisible issues (Denmark, Germany, Ireland)./
作者:	Goddard, Stacie Elizabeth.
面頁冊數:	473 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-02, Section: A, page: 0637.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-02A.
標題:	Political Science, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3080817

Uncommon ground: The making of indivisible issues (Denmark, Germany, Ireland).
Goddard, Stacie Elizabeth.

Uncommon ground: The making of indivisible issues (Denmark, Germany, Ireland). - 473 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-02, Section: A, page: 0637.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2003.

How is it that issues become indivisible: why is it that, under some conditions, actors appear unable to divide issues through partition, compensation, shared ownership, or other mechanisms of division? This thesis argues that issues are neither essentially divisible nor indivisible---there is no inherent property of an issue that determines its divisibility. Rather, indivisibility is a constructed characteristic of an issue. In particular, whether or not an issue appears to be indivisible depends upon how actors legitimate their claim to the issue during the bargaining process. While bargaining, actors not only make demands to an issue; they appeal to existing social relations and discursive resources---what I call the network structure of strategic interaction---to justify their claims. The way in which actors legitimate their claims is more than window dressing for their interests. Under some conditions, legitimation strategies can polarize networks, destroying extant ties between networks, and removing the possibility of a shared legitimate basis for negotiations. This polarized network structure locks actors into positions where they can no longer recognize any other claim to the issue as legitimate, leading to incompatible bargaining positions and indivisible conflict.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

Uncommon ground: The making of indivisible issues (Denmark, Germany, Ireland).
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245 1 0 $a Uncommon ground: The making of indivisible issues (Denmark, Germany, Ireland).
300 $a 473 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-02, Section: A, page: 0637.
500 $a Advisers: Jack L. Snyder; Robert L. Jervis.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2003.
520 $a How is it that issues become indivisible: why is it that, under some conditions, actors appear unable to divide issues through partition, compensation, shared ownership, or other mechanisms of division? This thesis argues that issues are neither essentially divisible nor indivisible---there is no inherent property of an issue that determines its divisibility. Rather, indivisibility is a constructed characteristic of an issue. In particular, whether or not an issue appears to be indivisible depends upon how actors legitimate their claim to the issue during the bargaining process. While bargaining, actors not only make demands to an issue; they appeal to existing social relations and discursive resources---what I call the network structure of strategic interaction---to justify their claims. The way in which actors legitimate their claims is more than window dressing for their interests. Under some conditions, legitimation strategies can polarize networks, destroying extant ties between networks, and removing the possibility of a shared legitimate basis for negotiations. This polarized network structure locks actors into positions where they can no longer recognize any other claim to the issue as legitimate, leading to incompatible bargaining positions and indivisible conflict.
520 $a I test the legitimation theory using multiple bargaining situations in two broad historical case studies. The first study examines two cases of conflicts over Schleswig-Holstein, a duchy that until 1864 was governed by both Denmark and the German Confederation. An 1848 conflict over the duchy proved divisible, with Denmark and Prussia agreeing to reinstate their shared sovereignty over the territory. Yet, only sixteen years later the powers would find themselves unable to divide the duchies. The second study explores several cases of bargaining over the status of Ireland from 1830 to 1921. In particular, using the legitimation theory I explain why the issue of Home Rule, divisible in the 19th century, became indivisible after 1916. The dissertation concludes with implications for political science theory and policy.
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