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Empirical evidence of the impact of ...

Evans, Thomas Andrew.

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Empirical evidence of the impact of discretionary federal spending on election outcomes, the rationality of campaign spending limits and the impact of representation per capita on the distribution of federal spending and taxing.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Empirical evidence of the impact of discretionary federal spending on election outcomes, the rationality of campaign spending limits and the impact of representation per capita on the distribution of federal spending and taxing./
作者:	Evans, Thomas Andrew.
面頁冊數:	101 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2181.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-06A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3093207

Empirical evidence of the impact of discretionary federal spending on election outcomes, the rationality of campaign spending limits and the impact of representation per capita on the distribution of federal spending and taxing.
Evans, Thomas Andrew.

Empirical evidence of the impact of discretionary federal spending on election outcomes, the rationality of campaign spending limits and the impact of representation per capita on the distribution of federal spending and taxing. - 101 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2181.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Clemson University, 2003.

The first section uses a new dataset to investigate the impact of federal spending on Canadian federal election outcomes between 1988 and 2000. No prior research has used a parliamentary system as the basis for this analysis, which is unfortunate in that parliamentary systems offer a cleaner test of the impact of discretionary spending on election outcomes than presidential systems. Using panel data and instrumental variable methods, consistent estimates indicate that each additional Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Empirical evidence of the impact of discretionary federal spending on election outcomes, the rationality of campaign spending limits and the impact of representation per capita on the distribution of federal spending and taxing.
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245 1 0 $a Empirical evidence of the impact of discretionary federal spending on election outcomes, the rationality of campaign spending limits and the impact of representation per capita on the distribution of federal spending and taxing.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2181.
500 $a Adviser: William R. Dougan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Clemson University, 2003.
520 $a The first section uses a new dataset to investigate the impact of federal spending on Canadian federal election outcomes between 1988 and 2000. No prior research has used a parliamentary system as the basis for this analysis, which is unfortunate in that parliamentary systems offer a cleaner test of the impact of discretionary spending on election outcomes than presidential systems. Using panel data and instrumental variable methods, consistent estimates indicate that each additional $1 00 per capita federal spending in an electoral district increases the majority candidate's vote share by 2.9 percentage points, whether or not the majority candidate is an incumbent. Farther, it is demonstrated that, in contrast to presidential systems in which the important distinction for voters is between incumbents and challengers, the important distinction for voters in parliamentary systems is between majority and opposition candidates: increases in Canadian federal spending and national GDP have positive and significant impacts on the share of the vote received by majority party incumbents, but no significant impact on opposition party incumbents.
520 $a Secondly, one of the dominant findings of the campaign spending literature is that the marginal impact of campaign spending is greater for challengers than for incumbents. If true, then rational incumbents would select one of the corner solutions of zero or infinite, for campaign spending limits. In Canadian federal elections, however, the finite campaign spending limits are not zero. This fact points to a possible non-linearity in the marginal impact of campaign spending. Using two panel datasets and controlling for the endogeneity of campaign spending, this paper investigates the Canadian federal elections of 1979 though 2000 and finds that at low levels of campaign spending the marginal impact of campaign spending is greater for majority party candidates than opposition candidates, but that diminishing returns set in more quickly for majority party candidates. The estimated optimal campaign-spending limits are similar in magnitude to actual spending limits, suggesting that campaign spending limits were selected with majority party vote-maximization as the objective.
520 $a Thirdly, there have been, and continue to be, a large variation in federal electoral district populations in Canada; however, regardless of the population, each electoral district has equal electoral importance. It is therefore possible to show that a rational vote-maximizing legislator would spend more, and tax less, per capita, the smaller the electoral district population. Using two separate panel datasets for spending, and one panel dataset for taxes, empirical support is found for both of these predictions. It is estimated that a reduction of the population of an electoral district by one person will increase the federal spending per capita by between $0 .003 and $0 .01, and decreases the income taxes per capita by approximately $0 .003. As an extension to the analysis, spending and taxes per capita are found to be significant, with the expected signs, when used to predict the share of the vote for the majority party candidate.
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