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Essays in corporate finance.

Brisley, Neil.

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Essays in corporate finance.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in corporate finance./
作者:	Brisley, Neil.
面頁冊數:	82 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-11, Section: A, page: 4147.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-11A.
標題:	Economics, Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3111307

Essays in corporate finance.
Brisley, Neil.

Essays in corporate finance. - 82 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-11, Section: A, page: 4147.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Institut Europeen d'Administration des Affaires (France), 2003.

Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives. Traditional executive stock option plans vest gradually over a period of several years and may climb deep In-The-Money long before the manager is allowed to exercise them. We show how early exercise provisions can be used to efficiently re-optimise incentives and we derive optimal vesting schedules as a function of stock price gains. When firms face risky-but-profitable Growth Opportunities we find that they should allow more options to vest the deeper they move In-The-Money, a result we term 'Progressive' Performance Vesting.Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Essays in corporate finance.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-11, Section: A, page: 4147.
500 $a Chair: Bernard Dumas.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Institut Europeen d'Administration des Affaires (France), 2003.
520 $a Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives. Traditional executive stock option plans vest gradually over a period of several years and may climb deep In-The-Money long before the manager is allowed to exercise them. We show how early exercise provisions can be used to efficiently re-optimise incentives and we derive optimal vesting schedules as a function of stock price gains. When firms face risky-but-profitable Growth Opportunities we find that they should allow more options to vest the deeper they move In-The-Money, a result we term 'Progressive' Performance Vesting.
520 $a Uncertain Reservation Prices in Initial Public Offerings. A significant proportion of IPO filings are subsequently withdrawn when it becomes clear to the issuer that its minimum acceptable offer price will not be achieved. Moreover, this ability to withdraw the IPO has been shown to reduce the amount of underpricing which must be offered to investors in return for information revelation. We ask whether the required underpricing will be lower---and IPO proceeds higher---when the issuer's 'reservation price' is disclosed at the outset or when it is kept secret. To avoid standard adverse selection issues, we assume that when an issuer's reservation price is not disclosed, investors form expectations of it which are unbiased on average. We show that when the issuer's reservation price is sufficiently high relative to possible investor valuations of the firm, the issuer enjoys improved IPO proceeds when its reservation price is revealed. Conversely, when the reservation price is low relative to possible investor valuations, the issuer prefers to maximize the market's uncertainty about it. Interestingly, over an intermediate range of reservation prices, we find that when investor uncertainty surrounding the reservation price is high, proceeds are maximized when this uncertainty is reduced but not eliminated.
520 $a A Comparative Analysis of IPO Proceeds Under Alternative Regulatory Environments: A Comment. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) contend that regulatory constraints on the ability of underwriters to price discriminate between investors can reduce the proceeds available to the issuer. We show that only under the assumption that regular institutional investors are, on average, less well informed than ordinary retail investors may the uniform pricing constraint bind. Otherwise, a uniform pricing restriction does not reduce IPO proceeds. When regular institutional investors are, on average, at least as well informed as ordinary retail investors we can now rule out the need for price discrimination.
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650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
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710 2 0 $a Institut Europeen d'Administration des Affaires (France). $3 1030221
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-11A.
790 1 0 $a Dumas, Bernard, $e advisor
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791 $a Ph.D.
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