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Boards of directors as signals of co...

Certo, S. Trevis.

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Boards of directors as signals of cooptation: A study of initial public offerings.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Boards of directors as signals of cooptation: A study of initial public offerings./
Author:	Certo, S. Trevis.
Description:	203 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3247.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-08A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Management. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9981056
ISBN:	0599872837

Boards of directors as signals of cooptation: A study of initial public offerings.
Certo, S. Trevis.

Boards of directors as signals of cooptation: A study of initial public offerings. - 203 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3247.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2000.

The relationship between boards of directors and firm performance has long intrigued scholars in multiple disciplines. This dissertation introduces the board of directors as a signal to investment bankers and potential investors in the initial public offering (IPO) process. I suggest that firms undertaking IPOs with property configured boards will experience better first day performance. Moreover, I suggest that environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance.

ISBN: 0599872837Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Boards of directors as signals of cooptation: A study of initial public offerings.
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100 1 $a Certo, S. Trevis. $3 615404
245 1 0 $a Boards of directors as signals of cooptation: A study of initial public offerings.
300 $a 203 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3247.
500 $a Adviser: Catherine M. Daily.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2000.
520 $a The relationship between boards of directors and firm performance has long intrigued scholars in multiple disciplines. This dissertation introduces the board of directors as a signal to investment bankers and potential investors in the initial public offering (IPO) process. I suggest that firms undertaking IPOs with property configured boards will experience better first day performance. Moreover, I suggest that environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance.
520 $a For firms undertaking EPOs, the stock price performance on the first day of trading represents a unique measure of firm performance. Underpricing, a phenomenon salient to firms undertaking IPOs, represents the difference between the stock price paid by the investment bankers and their clients prior to public trading (this price is known as the IPO's "offer price") and the stock's closing price after the first day of trading. Reductions in underpricing allow initial shareholders to retain the value of their firms and limit the amount of money left "on the table."
520 $a The purpose of this study is to introduce the board of directors as a signal of cooptation employed by firm management to abate underpricing. This study integrates two enduring theories from organization theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory, with a theory from economics and finance, signaling theory, to suggest that a prestigious board of directors with linkages to the focal firm's task environment may signal high firm quality. This study also suggests that environmental uncertainty, as measured by dynamism, munificence, and complexity, moderates the relationships between board characteristics and underpricing.
520 $a Results support the resource dependence perspective that board size operates as a signal used by firms to reduce underpricing. Neither the proportion of affiliated directors nor the prestige of the affiliated directors correlates significantly with underpricing Findings also indicate a positive relationship between complexity and underpricing, but neither dynamism nor munificence correlates with underpricing in the predicted manner. Results also indicate that munificence moderates the relationship between board prestige and underpricing.
590 $a School code: 0093.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
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710 2 0 $a Indiana University. $3 960096
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 61-08A.
790 1 0 $a Daily, Catherine M., $e advisor
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2000
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9981056