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Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-f...

Cheng, Kai-Yuan.

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Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein).

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein)./
Author:	Cheng, Kai-Yuan.
Description:	292 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3220.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-09A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3063818
ISBN:	049382751X

Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein).
Cheng, Kai-Yuan.

Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein). - 292 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3220.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2002.

The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics.

ISBN: 049382751XSubjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein).
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100 1 $a Cheng, Kai-Yuan. $3 1945196
245 1 0 $a Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (Saul Kripke, Ludwig Wittgenstein).
300 $a 292 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3220.
500 $a Adviser: Michael Levin.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2002.
520 $a The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics.
520 $a Gaining insights from previous dispositionalist accounts of meaning and rule-following, including those of Dretske, Fodor, Millikan, Martin & Heil, Shogenji, and Yallowitz, my project is to put all those insights together to formulate a functional view of human dispositions to rule-following which will resolve the error, finitude, and first-person epistemic problems that Kripke raises against the dispositionalist approach. Specifically, I argue that rule-following or meaning consists in one's possessing a disposition, realistically construed. A rule-following disposition is real in the sense that it is responsible for, and hence not to be equated with, its manifestations under various conditions. A person acquires a real disposition to rule-following through a learning history which is constrained by biologically innate human endowments of learning and cognition. The error problem then becomes the problem of how to identify the disposition without vacuity or circularity. My claim is that identifying a rule-following disposition is a task of scientific hypothesizing, which is epistemically and methodologically sound. The finitude problem is in my view a form of Humean inductive skepticism. My response to it is to adopt a reliabilist theory of justification and its treatment of the induction problem. A distinctive contribution of mine is to offer a functionalist account of dispositions and introspection in the resolution of the first-person epistemic problem. My aim is to do full justice to the phenomenology and epistemology of meaning and rule-following from the first-person point of view.
520 $a My conclusion is that a satisfactory dispositional account such as the one I offer not only vindicates the reality of rule-following and meaning but also increases our understanding of the nature of meaning and human rule-following phenomenon.
590 $a School code: 0046.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
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710 2 0 $a City University of New York. $3 1018111
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 63-09A.
790 1 0 $a Levin, Michael, $e advisor
790 $a 0046
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2002
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3063818