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The value of internal accounting rep...

Bainbridge, Theodore Adam.

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The value of internal accounting reports in finite multiperiod agencies of uncertain duration: Theoretical modeling and experimental evidence.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The value of internal accounting reports in finite multiperiod agencies of uncertain duration: Theoretical modeling and experimental evidence./
Author:	Bainbridge, Theodore Adam.
Description:	436 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-11, Section: A, page: 4447.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-11A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9996066
ISBN:	0493040994

The value of internal accounting reports in finite multiperiod agencies of uncertain duration: Theoretical modeling and experimental evidence.
Bainbridge, Theodore Adam.

The value of internal accounting reports in finite multiperiod agencies of uncertain duration: Theoretical modeling and experimental evidence. - 436 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-11, Section: A, page: 4447.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2000.

This dissertation examines the value of internal cost reports in multiperiod agencies of finite but uncertain duration, wherein repeated investment decisions must depend on unverifiable cost reports.

ISBN: 0493040994Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

The value of internal accounting reports in finite multiperiod agencies of uncertain duration: Theoretical modeling and experimental evidence.
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100 1 $a Bainbridge, Theodore Adam. $3 1945149
245 1 4 $a The value of internal accounting reports in finite multiperiod agencies of uncertain duration: Theoretical modeling and experimental evidence.
300 $a 436 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-11, Section: A, page: 4447.
500 $a Supervisor: Douglas V. DeJong.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2000.
520 $a This dissertation examines the value of internal cost reports in multiperiod agencies of finite but uncertain duration, wherein repeated investment decisions must depend on unverifiable cost reports.
520 $a Modeling shows an efficient way for the principal to induce honest reporting by the agent in all periods is as follows. Invest in the first period if the value of production exceeds expected production cost. If the cost report is high, pay the agent zero and halt production; if low, pay S(1 - P tPL) and continue production in the next period. S is the difference between high and low costs of production, PL is the probability nature will impose a low cost state, and Pt is the probability of continuing to the next period given that period t has been completed with a low cost report. These results shed further light on the value of, and endogenous demand for, accounting information and long term contracting.
520 $a Experiments test various theories' ability to predict principals' and agents' behavior under the conditions modeled. A new method separates equilibrium and nonequilibrium data. This method makes sharper distinctions between the two behaviors and preserves more data than previously-used methods.
520 $a Experiments reveal the following. About three-quarters of agents followed the irrational/unknown-opponent strategy. The same number followed the farsighted strategy. Few agents followed the nearsighted strategy. A significant minority of agents followed none of the above strategies. The optimal memory contract induced as much honest reporting as any other contract tested, while saliently reducing principals' payments to agents. When principals tried to reduce agency costs further, honest reporting decreased dramatically. When principals increased agency costs saliently, honest reporting did not increase. When given a reporting choice, some economically indifferent agents always report honestly, while others do not. Longer agencies induced more honest reporting than shorter agencies.
590 $a School code: 0096.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Psychology, Experimental. $3 517106
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690 $a 0511
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710 2 0 $a The University of Iowa. $3 1017439
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 61-11A.
790 1 0 $a DeJong, Douglas V., $e advisor
790 $a 0096
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2000
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9996066