東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Prophet sharing: Strategic interact...

Taylor, Julie Elaine.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Prophet sharing: Strategic interaction between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes (Egypt, Iran).

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Prophet sharing: Strategic interaction between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes (Egypt, Iran)./
作者:	Taylor, Julie Elaine.
面頁冊數:	200 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-10, Section: A, page: 3833.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-10A.
標題:	Political Science, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoeng/servlet/advanced?query=3110841

Prophet sharing: Strategic interaction between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes (Egypt, Iran).
Taylor, Julie Elaine.

Prophet sharing: Strategic interaction between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes (Egypt, Iran). - 200 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-10, Section: A, page: 3833.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2004.

Islamic clerics have both supported and undermined regimes in the Middle East. Egyptian clerics, in the 1980s and 1990s, discredited Islamic extremists intent on overthrowing the government. In contrast, Iran's ayatollahs helped depose the Shah in 1979.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

Prophet sharing: Strategic interaction between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes (Egypt, Iran).
LDR:03248nmm 2200313 4500 001 1856916
005 20040723081434.5
008 130614s2004 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3110841
035 $a AAI3110841
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Taylor, Julie Elaine. $3 1944668
245 1 0 $a Prophet sharing: Strategic interaction between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes (Egypt, Iran).
300 $a 200 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-10, Section: A, page: 3833.
500 $a Chair: Leonard Binder.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2004.
520 $a Islamic clerics have both supported and undermined regimes in the Middle East. Egyptian clerics, in the 1980s and 1990s, discredited Islamic extremists intent on overthrowing the government. In contrast, Iran's ayatollahs helped depose the Shah in 1979.
520 $a The disparity in clerical behavior raises the question: What determines the likelihood of cooperation or conflict between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes? The dominant hypothesis suggests that clerical support for the regime derives from the doctrine of political authority endorsed by its sect. With regard to the two countries forming the basis of this study, such a hypothesis predicts passivity from Egypt's Sunni clerics who maintain that tyranny is preferable to civil strife, and defiance from Iran's Shi'i clerics who proclaim worldly government to be illegitimate.
520 $a Yet, the historical record of both countries includes numerous examples that contradict the doctrinal thesis. Egypt's Sunni clerics at times led protests against the regime and Iran's history includes long periods of regime-clerical cooperation. My research demonstrates that patterns of conflict and cooperation are not determined by the clerics' ideological disposition, but rather, by the interaction between the clerics and the regime as each pursues their independent interests.
520 $a Three considerations strongly influence the strategy selection of regimes and the clerics: (1) the agenda of the opposition; (2) the level of popular opposition; and (3) the clerics' responsiveness to public opinion. My research demonstrates that conflict between clerics and regimes is rare because the factors promoting clerical opposition to the regime are the same factors that increase the regime's need to draw on clerical support. For the clerics, an increase in the level of popular opposition enhances the potential benefits of opposition to the regime. Yet, this shift also intensifies the utility of public support to the regime, and thus raises the value of the clergy's endorsement. Upon provision of a side-payment, clerics do not defect. In sum, my dissertation explains when regime-clerical conflict occurs, when clerics posses the greatest influence over the regime, and when the clerical establishment is likely to splinter.
590 $a School code: 0031.
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a Religion, Clergy. $3 1017702
650 4 $a History, Middle Eastern. $3 1017544
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0319
690 $a 0333
710 2 0 $a University of California, Los Angeles. $3 626622
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-10A.
790 1 0 $a Binder, Leonard, $e advisor
790 $a 0031
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoeng/servlet/advanced?query=3110841