東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

The political economy of factions: V...

Humphreys, Macartan.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

The political economy of factions: Voting, bargaining and coercion.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The political economy of factions: Voting, bargaining and coercion./
Author:	Humphreys, Macartan.
Description:	125 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-01, Section: A, page: 0271.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-01A.
Subject:	Political Science, General. -
ISBN:	0493973575

The political economy of factions: Voting, bargaining and coercion.
Humphreys, Macartan.

The political economy of factions: Voting, bargaining and coercion. - 125 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-01, Section: A, page: 0271.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.

This dissertation develops game theoretic methods to study political interactions between internally fragmented groups. Each of the central chapters focuses on a major puzzle associated with each of three forms of political interaction: voting, bargaining, and coercion. The field of application of the results is wide, including peace negotiations, corporatist bargaining, international trade negotiations, and ethnic voting and ethnic violence.

ISBN: 0493973575Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

The political economy of factions: Voting, bargaining and coercion.
LDR:03486nmm 2200301 4500 001 1856605
005 20040702083617.5
008 130614s2003 eng d
020 $a 0493973575
035 $a (UnM)AAI3076895
035 $a AAI3076895
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Humphreys, Macartan. $3 1012264
245 1 0 $a The political economy of factions: Voting, bargaining and coercion.
300 $a 125 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-01, Section: A, page: 0271.
500 $a Adviser: Robert H. Bates.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.
520 $a This dissertation develops game theoretic methods to study political interactions between internally fragmented groups. Each of the central chapters focuses on a major puzzle associated with each of three forms of political interaction: voting, bargaining, and coercion. The field of application of the results is wide, including peace negotiations, corporatist bargaining, international trade negotiations, and ethnic voting and ethnic violence.
520 $a In the chapter on voting I consider contexts where decisions are made by multiple groups, each using majority rule. Formal models suggest that a set of stable policies (the “core”) generally exists for majority rule decision-making within a single group if and only if there is only a single dimension of contention. Finding analogous conditions for core existence when an <italic>n</italic>-dimensional action requires agreement from <italic> m</italic> fragmented groups has been an open problem. I provide a solution to this problem by establishing sufficient conditions for core existence and characterizing the location and dimensionality of the core whenever <italic> n</italic> ≤ <italic>m</italic>. In higher dimensions, however, the core is generically empty.
520 $a In the chapter on bargaining I study the conjecture (the “Schelling conjecture”) that negotiators benefit from their differences with their constituencies. Since internal fragmentation may sometimes make bargaining difficult, the problem is to know when heterogeneity helps and when it hinders a sides ability to negotiate. Traditional approaches assume that negotiators are sophisticated while ratifiers are not. I demonstrate that these approaches misidentify bargaining outcomes in a wide class of cases. When an appropriate methodology is applied, the conjecture does not stand up well. In response, I allow, more realistically, for ratifiers to be sophisticated—acting as political agents rather than as technical constraints. In general when this occurs, the Schelling conjecture is supported.
520 $a In the chapter on coercion I study cases where political actors cannot depend on majority decisions to be enforced or expect bargained agreements to be honored. Instead they use coercion to attain their objectives unilaterally. For such contexts I develop a model that provides a mapping from cleavage structures and group size to aggregate levels of coercion. A key finding is that measures of ethnic polarization presently employed in empirical work are incapable of capturing—<italic>even qualitatively</italic>—the relationship between coalitional structures and social polarization.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-01A.
790 1 0 $a Bates, Robert H., $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003