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Three essays in macroeconomics: How...

Wassell, Charles Stephen, Jr.

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Three essays in macroeconomics: How well does the United States unemployment insurance system work?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three essays in macroeconomics: How well does the United States unemployment insurance system work?/
作者:	Wassell, Charles Stephen, Jr.
面頁冊數:	168 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1789.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-05A.
標題:	Economics, Labor. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3089701

Three essays in macroeconomics: How well does the United States unemployment insurance system work?
Wassell, Charles Stephen, Jr.

Three essays in macroeconomics: How well does the United States unemployment insurance system work? - 168 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1789.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2003.

The literature on the effectiveness of the United States unemployment insurance (UI) system does not simultaneously address the heterogeneity of the U.S. population and its workplace and consequently may not accurately portray the UI system. In this thesis, I provide the first analysis of the U.S. UI system that simultaneously incorporates the three channels through which UI enhances agents' welfare: consumption smoothing across employment states, improved job matching during the reemployment process, and redistribution of wealth across agents.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019135
Economics, Labor.

Three essays in macroeconomics: How well does the United States unemployment insurance system work?
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245 1 0 $a Three essays in macroeconomics: How well does the United States unemployment insurance system work?
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1789.
500 $a Supervisor: Rodolfo Manuelli.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2003.
520 $a The literature on the effectiveness of the United States unemployment insurance (UI) system does not simultaneously address the heterogeneity of the U.S. population and its workplace and consequently may not accurately portray the UI system. In this thesis, I provide the first analysis of the U.S. UI system that simultaneously incorporates the three channels through which UI enhances agents' welfare: consumption smoothing across employment states, improved job matching during the reemployment process, and redistribution of wealth across agents.
520 $a In Chapter 1, I calibrate an equilibrium model of agent saving, effort, and employment decisions, in the U.S. economy and UI system that incorporates moral hazard. Comparing labor and capital market measures in this model to those from an identical economy without UI, I find that mean agent welfare would decrease by 3.1% if the current UI system were abolished, but could increase by over 2% if several statutory changes were made.
520 $a In Chapter 2, I use dynamic contracting methods to find a social planner's solutions to my model. For two lower bounds on promised expected utility, I find that mean welfare could be increased by over 10% if there were no restrictions on transfers between agents, and by up to 8.5% in the complete absence of transfers across educational groups. Additionally, I find that a fully experience-rated system would have a negligible effect on the unemployment rate.
520 $a In Chapter 3, I analyze an optimal UI contract in an economy with duration dependence in the employment process. Numerical analyses of the optimal contract indicate that: (1) while the wage tax rate after reemployment is constant, it should decrease with the duration of unemployment; and (2) there is an endogenous lower bound on the utility promised to agents in the presence of negative duration dependence. Further numerical analyses assess the role of active labor market policies in an optimal unemployment insurance program.
590 $a School code: 0262.
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
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650 4 $a Sociology, Public and Social Welfare. $3 1017909
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
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