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Beyond hegemony (but well short of m...

O'Hanlon, Michael Edward.

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Beyond hegemony (but well short of multipolarity): A U.S. military posture for forward presence, crisis response, and a "1/2 war".

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Beyond hegemony (but well short of multipolarity): A U.S. military posture for forward presence, crisis response, and a "1/2 war"./
作者:	O'Hanlon, Michael Edward.
面頁冊數:	401 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-12, Section: A, page: 4268.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International51-12A.
標題:	Political Science, International Law and Relations. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9112285

Beyond hegemony (but well short of multipolarity): A U.S. military posture for forward presence, crisis response, and a "1/2 war".
O'Hanlon, Michael Edward.

Beyond hegemony (but well short of multipolarity): A U.S. military posture for forward presence, crisis response, and a "1/2 war". - 401 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-12, Section: A, page: 4268.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 1991.

The article begins with a set of strategic assumptions--most notably that the prospects of U.S.-Soviet war are extremely low, that the U.S. military remains a stabilizing influence in many theatres, and that U.S. grand strategy allocates too high a percent of total foreign-policy resources to defense and not enough to other areas. It then argues that Washington's interests in the Third World, while nowhere truly vital, are sufficient to justify a measured degree of global military presence and engagement. These interests, together with likely threats against the interests, can be protected best through a two-tiered force posture. Forces adept at maintaining forward presence and responding rapidly to crises--logistics ships and aircraft, aircraft carrier groups, some tactical aircraft, some small ground-combat units, and most of the overseas base structure--constitute the tier of greatest importance; large forces for combined ground-air battle constitute the second tier, and are desirable primarily as deterrents of last resort. Historical, political, and military analysis suggests that forces of the first tier can be cut back somewhat, and that forces of the second tier can be cut back sharply, without harming the global deterrent role of the U.S. military. The resulting force posture would cost about Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017399
Political Science, International Law and Relations.

Beyond hegemony (but well short of multipolarity): A U.S. military posture for forward presence, crisis response, and a "1/2 war".
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520 $a The article begins with a set of strategic assumptions--most notably that the prospects of U.S.-Soviet war are extremely low, that the U.S. military remains a stabilizing influence in many theatres, and that U.S. grand strategy allocates too high a percent of total foreign-policy resources to defense and not enough to other areas. It then argues that Washington's interests in the Third World, while nowhere truly vital, are sufficient to justify a measured degree of global military presence and engagement. These interests, together with likely threats against the interests, can be protected best through a two-tiered force posture. Forces adept at maintaining forward presence and responding rapidly to crises--logistics ships and aircraft, aircraft carrier groups, some tactical aircraft, some small ground-combat units, and most of the overseas base structure--constitute the tier of greatest importance; large forces for combined ground-air battle constitute the second tier, and are desirable primarily as deterrents of last resort. Historical, political, and military analysis suggests that forces of the first tier can be cut back somewhat, and that forces of the second tier can be cut back sharply, without harming the global deterrent role of the U.S. military. The resulting force posture would cost about $2 00 billion in 1990 dollars, somewhat more than the cost of Kaufmann's proposal for a Europe-oriented force posture (from {\it Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending),\/} but less than virtually all proposals currently driving the budget debates in Washington.
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