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Essays on bounded rationality.

Li, Jing.

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Essays on bounded rationality.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on bounded rationality./
作者:	Li, Jing.
面頁冊數:	94 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-08, Section: A, page: 3107.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-08A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3143212
ISBN:	049601188X

Essays on bounded rationality.
Li, Jing.

Essays on bounded rationality. - 94 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-08, Section: A, page: 3107.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2004.

In this dissertation, I explore single-person and interactive decision-making with boundedly rational agents. In the first essay, I examine the effects of ethical considerations on equilibrium behavior in normal form games. I model ethics as a ranking of pure strategies conditional on one's beliefs about the opponent's action. I assume that all else equal, one benefits from choosing the ethical action, and that the more ethical the opponent is, the larger the benefit. Different players may put different weights on the payoffs associated with the ethical implications of an action as opposed to those associated with its material implications. The model provides a new perspective to understanding social preferences. I show that when efficiency and fairness are the underlying ethical principles, in equilibrium, players may maximize total surplus of the game instead of their own material payoffs, and act altruistically or in retaliation towards each other.

ISBN: 049601188XSubjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Essays on bounded rationality.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-08, Section: A, page: 3107.
500 $a Supervisor: Barton L. Lipman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2004.
520 $a In this dissertation, I explore single-person and interactive decision-making with boundedly rational agents. In the first essay, I examine the effects of ethical considerations on equilibrium behavior in normal form games. I model ethics as a ranking of pure strategies conditional on one's beliefs about the opponent's action. I assume that all else equal, one benefits from choosing the ethical action, and that the more ethical the opponent is, the larger the benefit. Different players may put different weights on the payoffs associated with the ethical implications of an action as opposed to those associated with its material implications. The model provides a new perspective to understanding social preferences. I show that when efficiency and fairness are the underlying ethical principles, in equilibrium, players may maximize total surplus of the game instead of their own material payoffs, and act altruistically or in retaliation towards each other.
520 $a The second essay constructs a set-theoretic model of unawareness. Unawareness refers to things that one does not know, that one does not know that one does not know, and so on ad infinitum. Previous results have shown that standard state space models are incapable of capturing the essence of unawareness. My model circumvents this impossibility by allowing the agent to have a subjective state space and a subjective information structure when he is unaware of some possibilities. Information is modelled as a pair consisting of factual information and awareness information . Factual information specifies the resolution of uncertainties. Awareness information specifies the list of uncertainties of which the agent is aware. Awareness information restricts the agent's understanding of the environment to those uncertainties of which he is aware, giving rise to the subjective state space and subjective factual information. Upon receipt of new information, the agent updates both his subjective state space and his subjective factual information. I characterize both knowledge and common knowledge with unawareness. The model has a structure parallel to the standard information partition model, retaining the desirable properties of information processing and hence facilitating potential applications.
590 $a School code: 0262.
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