東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Essays in development economics and ...

Jayachandran, Seema.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in development economics and political economy.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in development economics and political economy./
Author:	Jayachandran, Seema.
Description:	135 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-05, Section: A, page: 1880.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-05A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3131874
ISBN:	0496791141

Essays in development economics and political economy.
Jayachandran, Seema.

Essays in development economics and political economy. - 135 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-05, Section: A, page: 1880.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2004.

The first essay in this thesis presents a model of an agrarian economy and shows that workers supply labor more inelastically the poorer they are and the less easily they can borrow, save, or migrate in response to productivity shocks. Consequently, underdeveloped areas experience more wage volatility. This equilibrium effect makes workers worse off but insures landowners. Data on the agricultural wage in India for 1956--87 support the model. In districts with better banking or access to other areas, the agricultural wage is less influenced by weather fluctuations. The poor are vulnerable to productivity risk, and underdevelopment exacerbates this risk.

ISBN: 0496791141Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays in development economics and political economy.
LDR:03109nmm 2200313 4500 001 1845438
005 20051101074953.5
008 130614s2004 eng d
020 $a 0496791141
035 $a (UnM)AAI3131874
035 $a AAI3131874
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Jayachandran, Seema. $3 1933594
245 1 0 $a Essays in development economics and political economy.
300 $a 135 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-05, Section: A, page: 1880.
500 $a Adviser: Michael Kremer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2004.
520 $a The first essay in this thesis presents a model of an agrarian economy and shows that workers supply labor more inelastically the poorer they are and the less easily they can borrow, save, or migrate in response to productivity shocks. Consequently, underdeveloped areas experience more wage volatility. This equilibrium effect makes workers worse off but insures landowners. Data on the agricultural wage in India for 1956--87 support the model. In districts with better banking or access to other areas, the agricultural wage is less influenced by weather fluctuations. The poor are vulnerable to productivity risk, and underdevelopment exacerbates this risk.
520 $a The second essay demonstrates that changes in the political landscape have large effects on firms. In May 2001 Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party and tipped control of the United States Senate to the Democrats. In an event study of 498 large firms, I find that a firm lost 0.25% of market capitalization the week of Jeffords' surprise decision for every $1 00,000 in soft money it gave to the Republicans during the previous election. There is no strong evidence that donations to Democrats had comparable effects. Soft money is partly a proxy for how well each party's policy agenda suits a firm, but it also appears to affect how helpful each party is to a firm. A party's agenda likely affects firms in the same industry similarly, yet the link between donations and stock returns holds even within industries.
520 $a The third essay argues that odious debt---sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the governed and not for their benefit---could be prevented if it were made non-transferable to successor governments. An institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments who repudiate odious debt suffer no reputation loss, and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Third parties would not have incentives to evade this new form of economic sanction. However, an institution that ruled on existing debt might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors. Judgments about future lending to a particular government are more likely to be truthful.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0503
690 $a 0510
710 2 0 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 65-05A.
790 1 0 $a Kremer, Michael, $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3131874