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Cognitive science and metaphysics re...

Cavers-Huff, Dasiea Yvonne.

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Cognitive science and metaphysics revisited: Toward a theory of properties.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Cognitive science and metaphysics revisited: Toward a theory of properties./
作者:	Cavers-Huff, Dasiea Yvonne.
面頁冊數:	278 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-05, Section: A, page: 1746.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International58-05A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9732614
ISBN:	0591421356

Cognitive science and metaphysics revisited: Toward a theory of properties.
Cavers-Huff, Dasiea Yvonne.

Cognitive science and metaphysics revisited: Toward a theory of properties. - 278 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-05, Section: A, page: 1746.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Riverside, 1997.

This dissertation explores the implications of recent developments in cognitive science for the metaphysical problem of property attribution. The structure of this dissertation is as follows: first, I critique a number of received accounts of the basis of property attribution, and secondly, I survey some recent literature in cognitive psychology, and discuss its relevance to the ontological basis of the attribution of properties to objects. Finally, I draw a distinction between the ontological basis of our attribution of properties to objects, and the functional/teleological issue of how it is that we make such attributions. Although these issues have often been conflated, I argue that they are in fact, distinct. In a postscript to the dissertation, I provide a defense of materialist explanations in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind in general.

ISBN: 0591421356Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Cognitive science and metaphysics revisited: Toward a theory of properties.
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245 1 0 $a Cognitive science and metaphysics revisited: Toward a theory of properties.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-05, Section: A, page: 1746.
500 $a Co-Chairs: Alexander Rosenberg; Larry Wright.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Riverside, 1997.
520 $a This dissertation explores the implications of recent developments in cognitive science for the metaphysical problem of property attribution. The structure of this dissertation is as follows: first, I critique a number of received accounts of the basis of property attribution, and secondly, I survey some recent literature in cognitive psychology, and discuss its relevance to the ontological basis of the attribution of properties to objects. Finally, I draw a distinction between the ontological basis of our attribution of properties to objects, and the functional/teleological issue of how it is that we make such attributions. Although these issues have often been conflated, I argue that they are in fact, distinct. In a postscript to the dissertation, I provide a defense of materialist explanations in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind in general.
520 $a A number of traditional theories concerning the nature of properties are critiqued, such as various species of universal realism (Platonic realism, immanent relational (Lockean) realism, and immanent non-relational (Aristotelian) realism), nominalism, and trope theory. I argue that all of these accounts face serious difficulties.
520 $a At this point, I survey findings from contemporary cognitive psychology which suggest that many types of properties (in particular, the phenomenal properties) are constituted by complex relations between perceivers, objects, and environments.
520 $a One of the most devastating objections to this type of theory is that it implies that all of our perceptions are erroneous. This type of theory suggests that the phenomenal properties presented in perception are not intrinsic features of objects, but consist of these complex relations. The way that I attempt to mitigate the force of this objection is to distinguish between the ontological basis of the attribution of properties, and the functional/teleological basis of such attributions. Although it may be a mistake to view these properties as residing in objects, there is an explanation, in terms of evolutionary biology, as to the pervasiveness of our experience of this grand illusion.
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