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Auditor's pre-negotiation informatio...

Zhang, Yun.

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Auditor's pre-negotiation information, accuracy of financial reports and consulting services.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Auditor's pre-negotiation information, accuracy of financial reports and consulting services./
作者:	Zhang, Yun.
面頁冊數:	122 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-03, Section: A, page: 1018.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-03A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3125342
ISBN:	0496726325

Auditor's pre-negotiation information, accuracy of financial reports and consulting services.
Zhang, Yun.

Auditor's pre-negotiation information, accuracy of financial reports and consulting services. - 122 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-03, Section: A, page: 1018.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2004.

The financial reporting process is modeled as a negotiation game between an auditor and a manager. A breakdown in this negotiation leads to costly additional auditing, for uncovering more accurate financial facts. This dissertation focuses on the auditor's pre-negotiation information, namely, the auditor's knowledge about the client. In particular, I analyze the impact of this information on the accuracy of final financial reports. Counter-intuitively, this dissertation shows, exogenously giving an auditor more pre-negotiation information can lead to less accurate financial reports by lowering the likelihood of a negotiation breakdown.

ISBN: 0496726325Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Auditor's pre-negotiation information, accuracy of financial reports and consulting services.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-03, Section: A, page: 1018.
500 $a Director: Rick Antle.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2004.
520 $a The financial reporting process is modeled as a negotiation game between an auditor and a manager. A breakdown in this negotiation leads to costly additional auditing, for uncovering more accurate financial facts. This dissertation focuses on the auditor's pre-negotiation information, namely, the auditor's knowledge about the client. In particular, I analyze the impact of this information on the accuracy of final financial reports. Counter-intuitively, this dissertation shows, exogenously giving an auditor more pre-negotiation information can lead to less accurate financial reports by lowering the likelihood of a negotiation breakdown.
520 $a The auditor's access to the pre-negotiation information is then endogenized. This dissertation characterizes the information acquisition game between the manager and auditor in the pre-negotiation stage. First, I consider a situation that allows the manager to strategically influence the auditor's pre-negotiation information. The dissertation characterizes this manager's strategic information delegation decision. I show that the manager tends to keep information from a lenient auditor, one less willing to push the negotiation to a disagreement, in order to retain the rents from inflated reported earnings. Conversely, in order to avoid a costly negotiation breakdown, the manager tends to inform a tough auditor, one more willing to push the negotiation to break down and go through the additional auditing. Furthermore, I analyze the case where the auditor, rationally foreseeing the manager's strategic information delegation behavior, makes the pre-negotiation audit decision.
520 $a This dissertation has two main implications. First, an auditor can prefer a higher liability in order to convince the manager to provide more pre-negotiation information. This increase in liability makes the auditor tougher in the negotiation. As a result, the manager prefers giving more information in order to reduce the expected additional auditing cost. Accordingly, the auditor trades the increased liability of inaccuracy in financial reports for the benefits of getting access to more pre-negotiation information. Lastly, if information spills over from consulting to auditing and consequently serves as a channel through which the manager can influence the auditor's pre-negotiation information, the second main implication of my analysis shows that less accurate financial reports can be associated with the auditor-provided consulting services.
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