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Essays on incentive provisions.

Shi, Lan.

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Essays on incentive provisions.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on incentive provisions./
作者:	Shi, Lan.
面頁冊數:	135 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-06, Section: A, page: 2301.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-06A.
標題:	Economics, Commerce-Business. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3136542
ISBN:	0496837405

Essays on incentive provisions.
Shi, Lan.

Essays on incentive provisions. - 135 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-06, Section: A, page: 2301.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2004.

This dissertation studies incentive provisions. The first essay examines the classical incentives-insurance trade-off. The second essay investigates the role of consumer complaints in incentive provisions in bureaucratic settings.

ISBN: 0496837405Subjects--Topical Terms:

626649
Economics, Commerce-Business.

Essays on incentive provisions.
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520 $a This dissertation studies incentive provisions. The first essay examines the classical incentives-insurance trade-off. The second essay investigates the role of consumer complaints in incentive provisions in bureaucratic settings.
520 $a Traditional agency theory treats risk as pure measurement error, yielding the standard prediction of risk-incentive trade-off. The first essay proposes a model in which the agent can respond to risk: he can exert effort to collect information about the underlying state in order to make correct decisions. Such effort is thus more valuable in a riskier environment; and the implication is that incentives can increase with the risk that the agent can respond to. I test the model using data on CEOs. Market-wide risk is used to capture more risk for which CEOs' effort is not particularly valuable, and industry- and firm-specific risk are used to represent more "respondable" risk. I find that incentives for CEOs decrease with the former and increase with the latter. As the definition of the industry is broadened, the positive relation between incentives and industry-specific risk diminishes. I also find empirical support for the prediction that the variability of firms' investments increases with "respondable" risk.
520 $a Using the April 2001 Cincinnati riot as a natural experiment, the second essay examines police officers' response to a sudden change in their evaluation mechanism, i.e., the sharply increased media attention and the ensuing federal investigation. This heightened police officers' fear of being accused of "racial profiling." I find that during the remaining months of 2001, (i) arrests for crimes and citations for traffic violations decreased substantially, (ii) the decrease was more significant for offenses where police officers had more discretion, and (iii) the decrease in misdemeanor arrests was greater in communities with a higher percentage of African Americans. Monthly felonies (violent crimes and property crimes) surged during the same period. This evidence suggests that police officers responded through less aggressive policing when the evaluation mechanism tilted toward "consumer complaints."
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