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Essays on performance evaluation.

Ray, Korok.

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Essays on performance evaluation.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on performance evaluation./
Author:	Ray, Korok.
Description:	102 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-04, Section: A, page: 1488.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-04A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3128464
ISBN:	0496757269

Essays on performance evaluation.
Ray, Korok.

Essays on performance evaluation. - 102 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-04, Section: A, page: 1488.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2004.

This dissertation is a microeconomic exploration of performance evaluations.

ISBN: 0496757269Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Essays on performance evaluation.
LDR:02443nmm 2200337 4500 001 1840054
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008 130614s2004 eng d
020 $a 0496757269
035 $a (UnM)AAI3128464
035 $a AAI3128464
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Ray, Korok. $3 1928409
245 1 0 $a Essays on performance evaluation.
300 $a 102 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-04, Section: A, page: 1488.
500 $a Adviser: Edward P. Lazear.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2004.
520 $a This dissertation is a microeconomic exploration of performance evaluations.
520 $a The first essay examines the problem of evaluating performance on projects before they finish. Performance evaluations generate efficient sorting, providing the option to abandon the project if the early returns are low. Moreover, it is efficient to allocate more resources in the later stages of the project. The model explains staged financing in venture capital, up-or-out promotion rules, and turnover patterns in the labor market.
520 $a The second essay explores the reluctance of managers to distinguish performance between employees. Contrary to the most common explanation of this in the industrial psychology literature, this essay offers an economic reason for this phenomenon: managers pool performance to retain workers. The firm's equilibrium strategy is to fire if performance is sufficiently low, promote if performance is sufficiently high, and pool performance together otherwise.
520 $a The third essay examines how performance evaluations affect the optimal allocation of effort between a manager his subordinate. It models management as a team production problem between a manager and his subordinate, where the manager divides his time between producing output himself and advising his subordinate. Including individual performance measures on top of team performance measures causes the manager to spend more time advising his subordinate, while the manager and subordinate both spend less time producing output individually.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0510
690 $a 0272
690 $a 0454
710 2 0 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 65-04A.
790 1 0 $a Lazear, Edward P., $e advisor
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3128464