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Is there such a thing as a language?...

Cook, John Russell.

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Is there such a thing as a language? An examination of Donald Davidson's "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs".

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Is there such a thing as a language? An examination of Donald Davidson's "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"./
Author:	Cook, John Russell.
Description:	261 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-06, Section: A, page: 2266.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-06A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NQ69221
ISBN:	0612692213

Is there such a thing as a language? An examination of Donald Davidson's "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs".
Cook, John Russell.

Is there such a thing as a language? An examination of Donald Davidson's "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs". - 261 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-06, Section: A, page: 2266.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2002.

This thesis is an examination and partial defense of Donald Davidson's claim in "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" that there is no such thing as a language (as conceived by certain linguists and philosophers). In chapter 1, I argue that there is a common view of language in circulation in which it is regarded as an entity independent of the speaker's communicative-intentions and beliefs about what her words mean. Certain externalist theories put forward by Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge and Saul Kripke as well the conventionalist theories endorsed by David Lewis and Michael Dummett are attempts to explain how it is that the supposed gap between a speaker and this common, public language is bridged. In chapter 2, I argue that by rejecting this idea of a language we are able to shrink this supposed gap between a speaker and meaning. Following Davidson, I reject the idea that conventions play any necessary role in a theory of communication and meaning. I also argue that the debates between Davidson and these externalists revolve around their reliance on the notion of a common public language. A weaker form of externalism is suggested in which we can maintain our allegiance to the theory that external and social factors in part individuate the meanings of words and sentences, without at the same time having to give an account of how we stand related to this common public language. In chapter 3, I defend Davidson's argument against claims that he has mischaracterized both what interpretation actually consists in and the psychological status of a theory of meaning. In chapter 4, I compare Davidson's recent account of meaning with the work of Paul Grice. Despite the seeming convergence of their views, the Gricean theory fails to recognize the autonomy of meaning, to provide an extensional semantics, and to present a non-circular account of the relation between thought and language. In chapter 5, I show that Davidson is not contradicting his earlier views about language by presenting evidence that his no-language thesis is a natural consequence of the views of his earliest essays. I also consider Noam Chomsky's recent no-language thesis and compare it with Davidson's. Some experimental results from developmental psychology are presented that in part corroborate Davidson's emphasis on the role of triangulaton and communication-intentions and show where Chomsky and Davidson part ways.

ISBN: 0612692213Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Is there such a thing as a language? An examination of Donald Davidson's "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs".
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100 1 $a Cook, John Russell. $3 1926792
245 1 0 $a Is there such a thing as a language? An examination of Donald Davidson's "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs".
300 $a 261 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-06, Section: A, page: 2266.
500 $a Adviser: Lynd Forguson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2002.
520 $a This thesis is an examination and partial defense of Donald Davidson's claim in "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" that there is no such thing as a language (as conceived by certain linguists and philosophers). In chapter 1, I argue that there is a common view of language in circulation in which it is regarded as an entity independent of the speaker's communicative-intentions and beliefs about what her words mean. Certain externalist theories put forward by Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge and Saul Kripke as well the conventionalist theories endorsed by David Lewis and Michael Dummett are attempts to explain how it is that the supposed gap between a speaker and this common, public language is bridged. In chapter 2, I argue that by rejecting this idea of a language we are able to shrink this supposed gap between a speaker and meaning. Following Davidson, I reject the idea that conventions play any necessary role in a theory of communication and meaning. I also argue that the debates between Davidson and these externalists revolve around their reliance on the notion of a common public language. A weaker form of externalism is suggested in which we can maintain our allegiance to the theory that external and social factors in part individuate the meanings of words and sentences, without at the same time having to give an account of how we stand related to this common public language. In chapter 3, I defend Davidson's argument against claims that he has mischaracterized both what interpretation actually consists in and the psychological status of a theory of meaning. In chapter 4, I compare Davidson's recent account of meaning with the work of Paul Grice. Despite the seeming convergence of their views, the Gricean theory fails to recognize the autonomy of meaning, to provide an extensional semantics, and to present a non-circular account of the relation between thought and language. In chapter 5, I show that Davidson is not contradicting his earlier views about language by presenting evidence that his no-language thesis is a natural consequence of the views of his earliest essays. I also consider Noam Chomsky's recent no-language thesis and compare it with Davidson's. Some experimental results from developmental psychology are presented that in part corroborate Davidson's emphasis on the role of triangulaton and communication-intentions and show where Chomsky and Davidson part ways.
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