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Essays in industrial organization.

McCannon, Bryan C.

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Essays in industrial organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in industrial organization./
作者:	McCannon, Bryan C.
面頁冊數:	110 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-12, Section: A, page: 4574.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-12A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3114869
ISBN:	0496623588

Essays in industrial organization.
McCannon, Bryan C.

Essays in industrial organization. - 110 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-12, Section: A, page: 4574.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2003.

Industrial Organization addresses the strategic interaction of firms. A wide variety of topics fit this description. In this thesis, I address two particular avenues of interaction. Specifically, the competition between firms in labor markets and the development of differentiated products.

ISBN: 0496623588Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Essays in industrial organization.
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245 1 0 $a Essays in industrial organization.
300 $a 110 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-12, Section: A, page: 4574.
500 $a Adviser: Kala M. Krishna.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2003.
520 $a Industrial Organization addresses the strategic interaction of firms. A wide variety of topics fit this description. In this thesis, I address two particular avenues of interaction. Specifically, the competition between firms in labor markets and the development of differentiated products.
520 $a In the first chapter I address the phenomenon of labor raiding. Labor raiding refers to firms recruiting and hiring employed workers. If firms can retain their workers, raiding should only occur if the outside firm is a better match with the worker. Thus, raiding performs an efficient sorting function in labor markets. But, there exists a popular opinion outside of the economic literature is that raiding can cause excessive turnover.
520 $a I develop a model to reconcile these two opinions. I am able to show that for a specific range of parameters the unique equilibrium outcome has the worker left unprotected by his employer. Therefore, raiding can occur with the worker going to a new firm with no productive gain resulting in excessive raiding. This is in contrast to the literature on labor raiding and is due to a less restrictive environment. For all other values, an employer protects its good workers eliminating the excessive turnover.
520 $a The second chapter is a joint work with Dr. Kala Krishna. It addresses the following situation. Consider two cancer treatments to fight a particular form of the disease. If one treatment fails to work for a patient, the other can be tried. How do consumers choose which treatment to try first? What is the effect of consumer behavior on firm pricing? How similar are the treatments? Simply, we develop a model where ex ante identical consumers, whom only have statistical information about the success of a product and have the opportunity to resample if they desire, make purchase decisions and firms price and choose product scopes.
520 $a The outcomes under monopoly and duopoly are evaluated and compared. We find that the same set of outcomes arise under monopoly as under competition. Thus, competition does not affect the outcome. Furthermore, the firm with the larger scope need not charge higher prices in equilibrium or earn a greater profit. Also, firms do not choose scopes that overlap, or rather, firms develop products so that, at best, only one product can satisfy a particular consumer.
520 $a The goal of the third chapter is to extend the model presented in the second chapter to include an arbitrary number of firms. The optimal search procedure conducted by consumers becomes more complex. With only two products each consumer simply buys the best-valued product first, measured as the lowest price adjusted for probability of success. When there are many products, a failed purchase may give valuable information regarding the likelihood of success of other products. Hence, a consumer values not only price of a good and probability of success but also the information a failed purchase provides.
520 $a I am able to show that the solution in Chapter 2 holds to such an extension. That is, all firms choose scopes that are disjoint so that each consumer has, at best, one product that provides a successful purchase. Furthermore, the firms price to extract the consumer's entire surplus. Additionally, I generalize interdependent optimal search for a few interesting cases off the equilibrium path.
590 $a School code: 0176.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
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710 2 0 $a The Pennsylvania State University. $3 699896
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-12A.
790 1 0 $a Krishna, Kala M., $e advisor
790 $a 0176
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3114869