東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Authority and disclosure in manageri...

Singh, Ravi Inder.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Authority and disclosure in managerial agency problems.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Authority and disclosure in managerial agency problems./
作者:	Singh, Ravi Inder.
面頁冊數:	108 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3424.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-09A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3104149
ISBN:	9780496517176

Authority and disclosure in managerial agency problems.
Singh, Ravi Inder.

Authority and disclosure in managerial agency problems. - 108 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3424.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2003.

The information asymmetry between managers and investors is so potentially large that, unlike in the standard principal-agent model, investors may be unable to determine a firm's performance with certainty. To verify the reports issued by managers, investors rely on regulatory oversight and third-party monitors, such as auditors. The structure of a manager's compensation, the intensity of monitoring, and the severity of the penalties imposed by regulators jointly determine a manager's behavior. Little is understood about the nature of the resulting system of incentives, which is the first problem I address in this dissertation.

ISBN: 9780496517176Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Authority and disclosure in managerial agency problems.
LDR:03238nmm 2200301 4500 001 1835624
005 20071226140411.5
008 130610s2003 eng d
020 $a 9780496517176
035 $a (UMI)AAI3104149
035 $a AAI3104149
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Singh, Ravi Inder. $3 1924248
245 1 0 $a Authority and disclosure in managerial agency problems.
300 $a 108 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3424.
500 $a Adviser: Steven Tadelis.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2003.
520 $a The information asymmetry between managers and investors is so potentially large that, unlike in the standard principal-agent model, investors may be unable to determine a firm's performance with certainty. To verify the reports issued by managers, investors rely on regulatory oversight and third-party monitors, such as auditors. The structure of a manager's compensation, the intensity of monitoring, and the severity of the penalties imposed by regulators jointly determine a manager's behavior. Little is understood about the nature of the resulting system of incentives, which is the first problem I address in this dissertation.
520 $a I show that a manager may respond to an increase in incentive compensation by decreasing productive effort, despite the presence of an auditor. A policy that raises the penalty imposed on the manager for misreporting earnings improves the manager's incentives, but may worsen the auditor's incentives. If the auditor's oversight becomes sufficiently lax, such a policy may decrease investor welfare. When the manager and auditor side contract, the auditor is more likely to misreport profits, but gains better access to the manager's information about profits; the net impact on the quality of the auditor's reporting is therefore ambiguous. The model predicts that raising the liability of auditors is the most robust instrument for improving investor welfare.
520 $a Given the difficulty of measuring performance, incentive compensation may be a particularly costly instrument for aligning the interests of managers and investors. Another approach to limiting opportunism is to restrict managerial authority. To address this second issue, I explicitly model the costs and benefits of increasing managerial discretion. The optimal degree of authority depends on the value of a manager's information and knowledge and the cost of the incentives necessary to ensure that the manager does not abuse his power. Career concerns generally lower the cost of incentives, but may cause managers to ignore valuable information and take conservative courses of action, undermining the reason for delegating control in the first place. Investors can eliminate this conservative bias by using long-term contracts, which reward successful managers with greater future compensation and authority than would otherwise be optimal.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-09A.
790 1 0 $a Tadelis, Steven, $e advisor
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3104149