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Prepackaged law: The political econo...

Van Hoy, Jerry L.

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Prepackaged law: The political economy and organization of routine work at multi-branch legal services firms.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Prepackaged law: The political economy and organization of routine work at multi-branch legal services firms./
作者:	Van Hoy, Jerry L.
面頁冊數:	297 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 54-05, Section: A, page: 1958.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International54-05A.
標題:	Law. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9327307

Prepackaged law: The political economy and organization of routine work at multi-branch legal services firms.
Van Hoy, Jerry L.

Prepackaged law: The political economy and organization of routine work at multi-branch legal services firms. - 297 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 54-05, Section: A, page: 1958.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 1993.

This study examines the organization of work and incentives at multi-branch legal services firms. Multi-branch legal services firms serve blue collar-middle income clients at reasonable fees. These firms consist of a network of branch offices that are located in store front shopping centers. The firms attract clients with regional or national advertising campaigns. I show that multi-branch legal services firms reorganize the legal work commonly associated with solo and small firm practitioners to efficiently serve a large volume of clients. The organization of work and incentives at multi-branch legal services firms requires attorneys to delegate many of the tasks involved in managing the offices and producing legal work to secretaries (sometimes aided by elaborate computer systems). Attorneys are then able to focus on selling the firm's services to as many clients as possible.Subjects--Topical Terms:

600858
Law.

Prepackaged law: The political economy and organization of routine work at multi-branch legal services firms.
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245 1 0 $a Prepackaged law: The political economy and organization of routine work at multi-branch legal services firms.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 54-05, Section: A, page: 1958.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 1993.
520 $a This study examines the organization of work and incentives at multi-branch legal services firms. Multi-branch legal services firms serve blue collar-middle income clients at reasonable fees. These firms consist of a network of branch offices that are located in store front shopping centers. The firms attract clients with regional or national advertising campaigns. I show that multi-branch legal services firms reorganize the legal work commonly associated with solo and small firm practitioners to efficiently serve a large volume of clients. The organization of work and incentives at multi-branch legal services firms requires attorneys to delegate many of the tasks involved in managing the offices and producing legal work to secretaries (sometimes aided by elaborate computer systems). Attorneys are then able to focus on selling the firm's services to as many clients as possible.
520 $a Like solo practitioners, multi-branch attorneys retain responsibility for office productivity and profits. But firm management imposes a "prepackaged" production system on branch offices. The production systems provide a basic platform for the creation of documents and letters for each service provided. However, the prepackaged production systems help to create a dynamic where attorneys must sell a high volume of services on a regular basis for each office to remain profitable. Instead of providing individualized solutions for each client's problems, multi-branch attorneys sell standard solutions offered by the production platform.
520 $a I use these findings to assess theories of deprofessionalization and the proletarianization of the professions. I find little support for proletarianization theories that posit bureaucracy as a controlling mechanism in the workplace, or deprofessionalization theories that predict increased client power in relationships with professionals. I conclude that these and other theories of professional work are inadequate because they assume that all professional work is similar and that professional markets have the same characteristics. I show that the rise of multi-branch legal services firms is best explained by increased competition for jobs and clients in the market for personal legal services. Such competition has led to a labor market where some attorneys are willing to surrender their autonomy to a production system.
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