語系:
繁體中文
English
說明(常見問題)
回圖書館首頁
手機版館藏查詢
登入
回首頁
切換:
標籤
|
MARC模式
|
ISBD
Dynamic principal-agent models in co...
~
Wan, Xuhu.
FindBook
Google Book
Amazon
博客來
Dynamic principal-agent models in continuous time.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Dynamic principal-agent models in continuous time./
作者:
Wan, Xuhu.
面頁冊數:
52 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2329.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International66-06A.
標題:
Economics, Finance. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3180393
ISBN:
9780542204845
Dynamic principal-agent models in continuous time.
Wan, Xuhu.
Dynamic principal-agent models in continuous time.
- 52 p.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2329.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2005.
In this work, we present a unified approach to solve dynamic principal-agent problems in continuous time.
ISBN: 9780542204845Subjects--Topical Terms:
626650
Economics, Finance.
Dynamic principal-agent models in continuous time.
LDR
:02037nmm 2200289 4500
001
1831115
005
20070507072343.5
008
130610s2005 eng d
020
$a
9780542204845
035
$a
(UnM)AAI3180393
035
$a
AAI3180393
040
$a
UnM
$c
UnM
100
1
$a
Wan, Xuhu.
$3
1919926
245
1 0
$a
Dynamic principal-agent models in continuous time.
300
$a
52 p.
500
$a
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2329.
500
$a
Adviser: Jaksa Cvitanic.
502
$a
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2005.
520
$a
In this work, we present a unified approach to solve dynamic principal-agent problems in continuous time.
520
$a
First we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the first-best solution. When the principal and the agent have symmetric and complete information, we propose a new type of contract, so called the increasing state-contingent compensation, which can implement the first-best solution and is written on the uncertainty state and portfolio wealth, instead of being written on the observed control chosen by the agent, which other researchers usually do. When the underlying brownian motion is not observed, the first best solution is not implemented, we give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal contract subjecting to the agent's incentive compatibility when the agent has the separable utility function.
520
$a
We derive the stochastic maximum principle from the scratch to give necessary and sufficient conditions for contracts. Our methodology covers a number of frameworks considered in the existing literature. The work can be widely applied in the research of portfolio delegation and the problem of executive compensation.
590
$a
School code: 0208.
650
4
$a
Economics, Finance.
$3
626650
690
$a
0508
710
2 0
$a
University of Southern California.
$3
700129
773
0
$t
Dissertation Abstracts International
$g
66-06A.
790
1 0
$a
Cvitanic, Jaksa,
$e
advisor
790
$a
0208
791
$a
Ph.D.
792
$a
2005
856
4 0
$u
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3180393
筆 0 讀者評論
館藏地:
全部
電子資源
出版年:
卷號:
館藏
1 筆 • 頁數 1 •
1
條碼號
典藏地名稱
館藏流通類別
資料類型
索書號
使用類型
借閱狀態
預約狀態
備註欄
附件
W9221978
電子資源
11.線上閱覽_V
電子書
EB
一般使用(Normal)
在架
0
1 筆 • 頁數 1 •
1
多媒體
評論
新增評論
分享你的心得
Export
取書館
處理中
...
變更密碼
登入