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A question of balance: Strategic cul...

Young, Gregory Denton.

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A question of balance: Strategic culture and the Cold War.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A question of balance: Strategic culture and the Cold War./
作者:	Young, Gregory Denton.
面頁冊數:	327 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0711.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-02A.
標題:	History, Asia, Australia and Oceania. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3207735
ISBN:	9780542554827

A question of balance: Strategic culture and the Cold War.
Young, Gregory Denton.

A question of balance: Strategic culture and the Cold War. - 327 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0711.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2006.

It has been postulated that strategic culture is a causal variable for national military strategy and doctrine, but strategic culture can also provides a lens through which an adversary's strategy, weapons systems, operations and doctrine can be assessed. Realists have said that states will balance against the threat, but have often ignored how culture can affect threat perception. The traditional security dilemma would have states always responding to new weapons/strategy perceived as threatening by increasing their own defense. Yet, examinations of certain periods of the Cold War nuclear and conventional arms races find that not all changes or increases were responded to in kind by the U.S. or the USSR. This study examines the Soviet naval buildup in the seventies and the American development of "smart weapons" or the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the early 1980s. Evidence shows that the strategic culture of the U.S. and the USSR influenced the misperception of these events and therefore the responses were often based on an underestimation rather than an overestimation of the threat. The perception of threat was not based solely on the explosive force, number of weapons produced or other quantifiable military factors, but is often based on one's own idea of whether a weapon or strategy is appropriate for the strategic needs of the adversary. Strategic culture provides the benchmark to assess that need and thus the threat. A strategic culture approach will not replace the materiel structure of the international system at explaining great power interaction, but will provide an explanatory supplement when balancing behavior is lagged, the material structure is indeterminate or in transition.

ISBN: 9780542554827Subjects--Topical Terms:

626624
History, Asia, Australia and Oceania.

A question of balance: Strategic culture and the Cold War.
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