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Three essays on information and ince...

Takats, Elod.

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Three essays on information and incentives.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Three essays on information and incentives./
Author:	Takats, Elod.
Description:	147 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2678.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-07A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3227328
ISBN:	9780542789076

Three essays on information and incentives.
Takats, Elod.

Three essays on information and incentives. - 147 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2678.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2006.

The dissertation analyzes incentives and information in three different settings.

ISBN: 9780542789076Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Three essays on information and incentives.
LDR:03251nmm 2200325 4500 001 1828948
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035 $a (UMI)AAI3227328
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Takats, Elod. $3 1917823
245 1 0 $a Three essays on information and incentives.
300 $a 147 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2678.
500 $a Adviser: Patrick Bolton.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2006.
520 $a The dissertation analyzes incentives and information in three different settings.
520 $a The first chapter shows how excessive reporting, called "crying wolf", can dilute the information value of reports. Excessive reporting is investigated by undertaking the first formal analysis of money laundering enforcement. Banks monitor transactions and report suspicious activity to government agencies, which use these reports to identify investigation targets. Banks face fines should they fail to report money laundering. However, excessive fines force banks to report transactions which are less suspicious, thereby diluting information. The empirical evidence is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. The model is used to suggest implementable corrective policy measures, such as decreasing fines and introducing reporting fees. Furthermore, crying wolf is shown to be a general economic problem relevant to corporate finance, especially after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
520 $a The second chapter, co-authored with Anders Frederiksen, answers the question why firms motivate their employees with highly complex contracts containing fixed wages, bonuses, promise of promotion, and threat of firing. The theoretical model proposed is a job-assignment model with heterogeneous employees. The model shows that firing has a dual role: it is both an incentive and sorting device. Thus, quality-concerned firms might want to combine cost-efficient incentives with firing. A large set of the model's broader predictions is stated explicitly and shown to be consistent with data from the personnel records from a large pharmaceutical company.
520 $a The third chapter investigates small business lending as an information problem, where bank credit officers have additional information unavailable to their managers. The interaction is investigated under a fixed wage setup. Two kinds of inefficiencies arise in equilibrium: the credit officer either sometimes shirks or he is occasionally fired. In both cases lending falls below the first-best level. However, these inefficiencies might still be more efficient than eliminating the information asymmetries by employing more managers, which is called decentralization. The specification allows for investigating the effects of banking consolidation and technological change on small business lending.
590 $a School code: 0181.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
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710 2 0 $a Princeton University. $3 645579
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-07A.
790 1 0 $a Bolton, Patrick, $e advisor
790 $a 0181
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3227328