東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Two theoretical studies of insider t...

Huang, Hui.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Two theoretical studies of insider trading regulations.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Two theoretical studies of insider trading regulations./
作者:	Huang, Hui.
面頁冊數:	166 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0660.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-02A.
標題:	Economics, Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR12094
ISBN:	9780494120941

Two theoretical studies of insider trading regulations.
Huang, Hui.

Two theoretical studies of insider trading regulations. - 166 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0660.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 2005.

In this dissertation I apply game theory to study two aspects of insider trading regulations.

ISBN: 9780494120941Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Two theoretical studies of insider trading regulations.
LDR:03512nmm 2200277 4500 001 1827074
005 20061222090728.5
008 130610s2005 eng d
020 $a 9780494120941
035 $a (UnM)AAINR12094
035 $a AAINR12094
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Huang, Hui. $3 1916020
245 1 0 $a Two theoretical studies of insider trading regulations.
300 $a 166 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0660.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 2005.
520 $a In this dissertation I apply game theory to study two aspects of insider trading regulations.
520 $a The first essay, "Mandatory Disclosure and the Concealment of Information", studies the insider's reaction to mandatory disclosure regulations which require the insider to report his transactions after trades have been completed. In particular, I examine the effects of mandatory disclosure on price efficiency and market liquidity when the insider is risk-averse. Contrary to what people generally believe (as in Huddart, Hughes and Levine, 2001), mandatory disclosure may lead to less efficient prices and less liquid markets. I show that Huddart et al's results depend critically on their assumption that the insider is risk-neutral. Specifically, I differentiate between frequently and infrequently traded stocks and find that the effects of mandatory disclosure are different in the two cases. For inactive stocks, mandatory disclosure accelerates the price discovery process and increases market liquidity. But, surprisingly, for frequently traded stocks, mandatory disclosure slows down the price discovery process, increases liquidity in early periods, and decreases it in later periods.
520 $a The second essay, "Substitute Trading and the Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulations", extends the model of Kyle (1985) to study how insiders will trade in closely related stocks when laws prohibit them from using their "inside" information to trade their own stocks. I find that insiders can sometimes make more profit when insider trading is prohibited. Securities laws in the US and Canada prohibit insiders from trading their own stocks based on their private information. But in most cases it is not illegal for insiders to trade related stocks, such as stocks of that firm's competitors, suppliers, and customers. Borrowing from the law literature (Ayres and Bankman, 2001), I call insiders' trading in related stocks "substitute trading". This topic has not been treated by the previous economics and finance literature on insider trading regulations. I extend Kyle's (1985) model with one risky asset to a (static) model with two correlated assets. Two different trading environments are then studied, an opaque one and a transparent one. In the first, a market maker observes only the order flow of the asset he makes the market in, whereas in the second, the market maker also observes the order flow of the other (correlated) stock. I find that the prohibition of insider trading does limit the insiders' ability to profit from their private information in the transparent market. However, in the opaque market, the prohibition may actually help insiders to profit more.
590 $a School code: 0784.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Political Science, Public Administration. $3 1017438
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0617
710 2 0 $a The University of Western Ontario (Canada). $3 1017622
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-02A.
790 $a 0784
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR12094