東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Divine omniscience and the fatalist ...

Johnson, David Kyle.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma./
作者:	Johnson, David Kyle.
面頁冊數:	275 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0209.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-01A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3206970
ISBN:	9780542537387

Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma.
Johnson, David Kyle.

Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma. - 275 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0209.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Oklahoma, 2006.

Arguments against our free will pose a serious problem. Although there are not very many philosophers who call themselves fatalists, quite a few are convinced that fatalism follows from common assumptions. Assuming that most believe themselves to be free, identifying ways to avoid the conclusion of such fatalist arguments is quite an important task. I begin by dealing specifically with theological fatalism. I present many versions of theological fatalism, but come to the conclusion that only one version constitutes a genuine problem. That version, I argue, is reducible to a deeper fatalist dilemma that follows from assumptions so common that it must be faced by even the atheist: the mutually incompatibility of human freedom, the principle of alternate possibilities and bi-valance. After considering other objections to my argument, I conclude that the only way to avoid the fatalist conclusion is to either deny the principle of alternate possibilities or deny bi-valance. I argue that, although each option is somewhat problematic, denying bivalence is the more defensible of the two options.

ISBN: 9780542537387Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma.
LDR:01972nmm 2200277 4500 001 1823796
005 20061128083847.5
008 130610s2006 eng d
020 $a 9780542537387
035 $a (UnM)AAI3206970
035 $a AAI3206970
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Johnson, David Kyle. $3 1308074
245 1 0 $a Divine omniscience and the fatalist dilemma.
300 $a 275 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0209.
500 $a Adviser: Linda T. Zagzebski.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Oklahoma, 2006.
520 $a Arguments against our free will pose a serious problem. Although there are not very many philosophers who call themselves fatalists, quite a few are convinced that fatalism follows from common assumptions. Assuming that most believe themselves to be free, identifying ways to avoid the conclusion of such fatalist arguments is quite an important task. I begin by dealing specifically with theological fatalism. I present many versions of theological fatalism, but come to the conclusion that only one version constitutes a genuine problem. That version, I argue, is reducible to a deeper fatalist dilemma that follows from assumptions so common that it must be faced by even the atheist: the mutually incompatibility of human freedom, the principle of alternate possibilities and bi-valance. After considering other objections to my argument, I conclude that the only way to avoid the fatalist conclusion is to either deny the principle of alternate possibilities or deny bi-valance. I argue that, although each option is somewhat problematic, denying bivalence is the more defensible of the two options.
590 $a School code: 0169.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Religion, Philosophy of. $3 1017774
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0322
710 2 0 $a The University of Oklahoma. $3 1021915
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-01A.
790 1 0 $a Zagzebski, Linda T., $e advisor
790 $a 0169
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3206970