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Dynamic contract model under asymmet...

Kusuda, Yasuyuki.

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Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information./
作者:	Kusuda, Yasuyuki.
面頁冊數:	84 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0287.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-01A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3205020
ISBN:	9780542510717

Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information.
Kusuda, Yasuyuki.

Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information. - 84 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0287.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2006.

In this article, I propose a new approach by which incentive-compatible contract models are combined with a matching model to formulate a basic recursive contract model under asymmetric information. This model is expected to contain both incentive problems between principals and agents in "economics of incentive" and intertemporal transitory decision problems in "recursive economics." In this model I provide the traditional contract theory with a new interpretation about reservation utilities prior probability, and describe how the optimal contracts are determined in the recursive context.

ISBN: 9780542510717Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information.
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