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Essays on matching and mergers.

Chen, Jiawei.

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Essays on matching and mergers.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on matching and mergers./
作者:	Chen, Jiawei.
面頁冊數:	139 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4109.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-11A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3199322
ISBN:	9780542436154

Essays on matching and mergers.
Chen, Jiawei.

Essays on matching and mergers. - 139 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4109.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Johns Hopkins University, 2006.

This dissertation consists of two essays in industrial organization. The first essay investigates bias in merger evaluation due to cost misspecification. Persistent asymmetries in market shares are widely observed and lead to the prevalent assumption of cost asymmetries. However in some industries this assumption is challenged by casual observations, so I consider an alternative specification that also generates persistent asymmetries in market shares. In a dynamic oligopolistic model of price competition, firms are ex ante identical but develop different capacities and different market shares due to idiosyncratic shocks to their investments and depreciation. Based on this model, I simulate panel data of prices and quantities and predict price and welfare effects of hypothetical mergers. If we assume cost asymmetries, we will overestimate increases in average price and decreases in consumer surplus in the short run, and underestimate them in the long run. We will also predict increases in total surplus when in fact it would decrease, giving rise to misguided antitrust policies.

ISBN: 9780542436154Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on matching and mergers.
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520 $a This dissertation consists of two essays in industrial organization. The first essay investigates bias in merger evaluation due to cost misspecification. Persistent asymmetries in market shares are widely observed and lead to the prevalent assumption of cost asymmetries. However in some industries this assumption is challenged by casual observations, so I consider an alternative specification that also generates persistent asymmetries in market shares. In a dynamic oligopolistic model of price competition, firms are ex ante identical but develop different capacities and different market shares due to idiosyncratic shocks to their investments and depreciation. Based on this model, I simulate panel data of prices and quantities and predict price and welfare effects of hypothetical mergers. If we assume cost asymmetries, we will overestimate increases in average price and decreases in consumer surplus in the short run, and underestimate them in the long run. We will also predict increases in total surplus when in fact it would decrease, giving rise to misguided antitrust policies.
520 $a The second essay studies the business loan market. The approach is based on banks and firms caring about the quality of their partners, thus the matching of banks and firms is endogenously determined and it is shown that for an OLS regression of loan spreads on bank characteristics, firm characteristics, and non-spread loan characteristics, the regressors are correlated with the error term, making the estimates biased. To take into account the endogenous matching, a two-sided matching model is developed in which the matching is determined by the unique equilibrium of a two-sided matching game. Bayesian inference is feasible using a Gibbs sampling algorithm that performs Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations. Using a sample of 1369 U.S. loans from 1996 to 2003, I find evidence of positive assortative matching of sizes, explained by similar relationships between quality and size on both sides of the market. I also find that banks' risk and firms' risk significantly affect their respective quality. Bayesian estimates for the spread equation are noticeably different from the OLS estimates, confirming that controlling for the endogenous matching has significant impact on estimates of the spread equation.
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