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Capital controls and external debt t...

Al-Zein, Eza Ghassan.

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Capital controls and external debt term structure.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Capital controls and external debt term structure./
作者:	Al-Zein, Eza Ghassan.
面頁冊數:	123 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-09, Section: A, page: 3378.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-09A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3189543
ISBN:	9780542318405

Capital controls and external debt term structure.
Al-Zein, Eza Ghassan.

Capital controls and external debt term structure. - 123 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-09, Section: A, page: 3378.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Texas A&M University, 2005.

In my dissertation, I explore the relationship between capital controls and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, incorporating explicitly the role of international lenders. I look at specific types of capital controls which take the form of date-specific and maturity-specific reserve requirements on external borrowing. I consider two questions: How is the maturity structure of external debt determined in a world general equilibrium? What are the effects of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements on the maturity structure of external debt? Can they prevent a bank run?

ISBN: 9780542318405Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Capital controls and external debt term structure.
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245 1 0 $a Capital controls and external debt term structure.
300 $a 123 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-09, Section: A, page: 3378.
500 $a Chair: Leonardo Auernheimer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Texas A&M University, 2005.
520 $a In my dissertation, I explore the relationship between capital controls and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, incorporating explicitly the role of international lenders. I look at specific types of capital controls which take the form of date-specific and maturity-specific reserve requirements on external borrowing. I consider two questions: How is the maturity structure of external debt determined in a world general equilibrium? What are the effects of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements on the maturity structure of external debt? Can they prevent a bank run?
520 $a I develop a simple Diamond-Dybvig-type model with three dates. In the low income countries, banks arise endogenously. There are two short-term bonds and one long-term bond offered by the domestic banks to international lenders. First I look at a simple model were international lending is modeled exogenously. I consider explicitly the maturity composition of capital inflows to a domestic economy. I show that the holdings of both short-term bonds are not differentiated according to date.
520 $a Second, I consider international lending behavior explicitly. The world consists of two large open economies: one with high income and one with low income. The high income countries lend to low income countries. There exist multiple equilibria and some are characterized by relative price indeterminacy.
520 $a Third, I discuss date-specific and maturity-specific reserve requirements. In my setup reserve requirements play the role of a tax and the role of providing liquidity for each bond at different dates. I show that they reduce the scope of indeterminacy. In some equilibria, I identify a case in which the reserve requirement rate on the long-term debt must be higher than that on the short-term debt for a tilt towards a longer maturity structure.
520 $a Fourth, I introduce the possibility of an unexpected bank run. I show that some specific combination of date-and maturity-specific reserve requirements reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. With regard to the post-bank-run role of international lenders, I show that international lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after the occurrence of a bank run.
590 $a School code: 0803.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
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790 1 0 $a Auernheimer, Leonardo, $e advisor
790 $a 0803
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
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