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The value of rationality and the aim...

Yamada, Masahiro.

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The value of rationality and the aim of truth.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The value of rationality and the aim of truth./
Author:	Yamada, Masahiro.
Description:	187 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1380.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-04A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3170893
ISBN:	0542072807

The value of rationality and the aim of truth.
Yamada, Masahiro.

The value of rationality and the aim of truth. - 187 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1380.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2005.

A central task of epistemology is to provide an account of rational belief formation which accommodates two fundamental intuitions: (a) the justificatory status of an agent's belief supervenes on internal states of the agent and (b) intuitively rational ways of forming beliefs are, when circumstances are favorable, capable of yielding knowledge. The first intuition can be accommodated by treating belief formation/revision as instances of rule-following. It can be shown that given any rule, necessarily, if a rule is one of the right rules, then if one is in certain internal states, one is justified in holding certain beliefs. The antecedent of this conditional is a necessary truth because the value of rationality grounds the normative status of epistemic rules: Being rational requires the ability to think and the ability to think is constituted by the possession of concepts; thus, any two thinkers who have the same thoughts have reasons to follow the same rules. Therefore, the justificatory status of beliefs supervenes on internal states of the agent. Accommodating the second intuition requires understanding the difference between knowledge and merely true belief. The crucial difference is that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. A closer inspection of this non-accidentality condition reveals that concept-constitutive rules are in fact capable of yielding knowledge if circumstances are right.

ISBN: 0542072807Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

The value of rationality and the aim of truth.
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008 130610s2005 eng d
020 $a 0542072807
035 $a (UnM)AAI3170893
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100 1 $a Yamada, Masahiro. $3 1673040
245 1 4 $a The value of rationality and the aim of truth.
300 $a 187 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1380.
500 $a Adviser: Paul Boghossian.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2005.
520 $a A central task of epistemology is to provide an account of rational belief formation which accommodates two fundamental intuitions: (a) the justificatory status of an agent's belief supervenes on internal states of the agent and (b) intuitively rational ways of forming beliefs are, when circumstances are favorable, capable of yielding knowledge. The first intuition can be accommodated by treating belief formation/revision as instances of rule-following. It can be shown that given any rule, necessarily, if a rule is one of the right rules, then if one is in certain internal states, one is justified in holding certain beliefs. The antecedent of this conditional is a necessary truth because the value of rationality grounds the normative status of epistemic rules: Being rational requires the ability to think and the ability to think is constituted by the possession of concepts; thus, any two thinkers who have the same thoughts have reasons to follow the same rules. Therefore, the justificatory status of beliefs supervenes on internal states of the agent. Accommodating the second intuition requires understanding the difference between knowledge and merely true belief. The crucial difference is that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. A closer inspection of this non-accidentality condition reveals that concept-constitutive rules are in fact capable of yielding knowledge if circumstances are right.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
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710 2 0 $a New York University. $3 515735
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-04A.
790 1 0 $a Boghossian, Paul, $e advisor
790 $a 0146
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792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3170893