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The role of alethic affectivity in v...

Fairweather, Abrol.

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The role of alethic affectivity in virtue-based theories of knowledge.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The role of alethic affectivity in virtue-based theories of knowledge./
作者:	Fairweather, Abrol.
面頁冊數:	121 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0201.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-01A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3161532
ISBN:	0496951351

The role of alethic affectivity in virtue-based theories of knowledge.
Fairweather, Abrol.

The role of alethic affectivity in virtue-based theories of knowledge. - 121 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0201.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Santa Barbara, 2005.

In this dissertation I examine the growing trend in Epistemology of virtue-based theories of knowledge. More specifically, I defend a form of virtue-based epistemology which requires that a knower have certain affective states, alethic affects, in order to possess knowledge in a wide range of cases. This dissertation is an advancement to the current state of research because I here provide arguments for motive-based requirements for knowledge that are independent of any particular theory of virtue. Current advocates of motivational requirements for knowledge often justify their position by relying on the general theory of virtue they adopt.

ISBN: 0496951351Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

The role of alethic affectivity in virtue-based theories of knowledge.
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245 1 4 $a The role of alethic affectivity in virtue-based theories of knowledge.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0201.
500 $a Chair: Anthony Brueckner.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Santa Barbara, 2005.
520 $a In this dissertation I examine the growing trend in Epistemology of virtue-based theories of knowledge. More specifically, I defend a form of virtue-based epistemology which requires that a knower have certain affective states, alethic affects, in order to possess knowledge in a wide range of cases. This dissertation is an advancement to the current state of research because I here provide arguments for motive-based requirements for knowledge that are independent of any particular theory of virtue. Current advocates of motivational requirements for knowledge often justify their position by relying on the general theory of virtue they adopt.
520 $a I investigate the development of Virtue Epistemology from its inception as a reliabilist theory that did not radically change the landscape of Epistemology, to the more recent Neo-Aristotelian motive-based theories which introduce a controversial motivational element into the field. Having canvassed developments in the field, I examine the normative underpinnings of the main forms of Virtue Epistemology and find that three genus concepts of virtue are most commonly used. Virtue is seen as the excellence of either a faculty, skill or character. I argue that the character-based analysis of virtue is preferable in epistemology, and argue against both the skills and faculty account.
520 $a However, the character-based account requires some sort of emotive or affective component to virtue, and this is a controversial commitment. If the character-based account is to succeed, it must show the implied motivational element to be plausible. I argue that "alethic affectivity" is a necessary, though often overlooked, condition for many kinds of knowledge, and provides an adequate grounding for some form of motivation-based requirement for knowledge. Alethic affect in a knowing subject is necessary for the possession of evidence as evidence, and this in turn is necessary to base a belief on evidence. Furthermore, I argue that alethic affectivity is compatible with reliabilist and naturalistic perspectives in epistemology. I conclude that alethic affectivity is a necessary component for knowledge and is compatible with the presuppositions of most perspectives in the theory of knowledge.
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