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Essays in financial intermediation.

Drucker, Steven.

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Essays in financial intermediation.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in financial intermediation./
作者:	Drucker, Steven.
面頁冊數:	152 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1416.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-04A.
標題:	Business Administration, Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3171814
ISBN:	0542087227

Essays in financial intermediation.
Drucker, Steven.

Essays in financial intermediation. - 152 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1416.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

This dissertation contains three essays on topics in financial intermediation. The first chapter studies the effects of mergers between commercial banks and investment banks. I find prior to a public securities issuance, junk rated and local borrowers are likely to switch to commercial-investment banks when their existing lenders are pure commercial banks. These types of firms select their commercial-investment bank as public debt underwriter. The revealed preference for commercial-investment bank relationships suggests that there are benefits from the bank's ability to use private information from lending in investment banking. After merging, commercial-investment banks raise interest rates for junk rated and local continuing borrowers, but only when the bank-borrower relationship is exclusive, consistent with banks having information monopolies that allow for the extraction of merger-related gains. The second chapter, which is based on co-authored work with Manju Puri, examines whether there are efficiencies that benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to an issuer while also underwriting its public securities offering. We find issuers, particularly non investment-grade issuers for whom informational economies of scope are likely to be large, benefit through lower underwriter fees and discounted loan yield spreads. The companies that receive lower financing costs are likely to have more bargaining power than the firms in the first chapter who see increases in financing costs because concurrent issuers are larger and have multiple financing options. Underwriters, both commercial banks as well as investment banks, engage in concurrent lending and provide price discounts, albeit in different ways. We find concurrent lending helps underwriters build relationships, increasing the probability of receiving current and future business. The third chapter examines the role of performance pricing in syndicated loans. Performance priced loans allow the interest rate to adjust in the future based on observable measures of the borrower's financial condition. I find performance pricing is likely to be used when companies have high intangibles-to-assets ratios and in credit lines. Lead banks hold smaller proportions of performance priced loans, particularly when firms are informationally opaque, consistent with performance pricing reducing moral hazard problems in syndicates.

ISBN: 0542087227Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Essays in financial intermediation.
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